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I. INTRODUCTION
latrogenic injuries'-those caused by health care professionals
(HCPs)2 in the course of treating patients-raise significant ethical, le-
gal, and public policy issues.' With the advent of the AIDS epidemic,
4
1. Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 857 (Davis, 17th ed. 1989) defines "iatrogenic dis-
order" as "[a]ny adverse mental or physical condition induced in a patient by effects of treatment
by a physician or surgeon. Term implies that such effects could have been avoided by proper and
judicious care on the part of the physician, surgeon, or dentist."
2. This Article uses the term "health care professional" to indicate individuals engaged in
primary health care, such as physicians, dentists, nurses, and others who would be categorized as
professionals because of, inter alia, their specialized training, knowledge, and licensure. Because of
the special status of professionals in tort law, the term "health care professional" seems most
appropriate in the present context. More generic designations for such personnel include "health
care provider" and "health care worker" (HCW), the latter term being used by the Centers for
Disease Control (CDC). Although the name of the agency has been changed to Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDCP), see Preventive Health Amendments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-531,
Title III, § 312, 106 Stat. 3469, 3504 (1992), this Article will refer to the agency as the "CDC."
3. The continued practice by incompetent or incapacitated HCPs and the inability or refusal
of their professions to sanction them raise both personal and professional ethics issues. A recent
study by the Public Citizen's Health Research Group found that disciplinary authorities sanction
only about .5% of approximately 585,000 physicians in the U.S. each year. Only 11% of the disci-
plinary actions are based upon substandard care. In 1991, there were approximately 3000 discipli-
nary actions compared to an estimated 150,000 to 300,000 victims of medical malpractice. See
Public Citizen's Health Research Group, Comparing State Medical Boards (1992) (summarized in
2 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 73, 73 (1993)).
Malpractice litigation raises especially difficult legal issues: determining the professional stan-
dard of care in light of conflicting expert testimony, establishing a causal connection between the
conduct of the HCP and the injury sustained, implying negligence on the basis of the injury under
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, and requiring informed consent on the basis of a patient's need to
know rather than according to professional custom. See generally Steven E. Pegalis and Harvey F.
Wachsman, American Law of Medical Malpractice (Lawyers Co-op, 2d ed. 1992); David W. Loui-
sell and Harold Williams, Medical Malpractice (Matthew Bender, 1987 & Supp. 1992).
Pressing public policy issues include the need to control increases in health care costs, improve
access to health care services, and curb the "malpractice crisis" that has increased the cost of
malpractice insurance and caused the practice of "defensive" medicine and the withdrawal of
HCPs from certain areas of practice. See generally President's Commission for the Study of Ethi-
cal Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Securing Access to Health
Care: The Ethical Implications of Differences in the Availability of Health Services (1983); U.S.
Dep't of Health and Human Services, Report of the Task Force on Medical Liability and Mal-
practice (1987); Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Im-
plications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability (1986); Patricia M.
Danzon, An Economic Analysis of the Medical Malpractice System, I Behav. Sci & L. 39 (1983).
4. As of May 31, 1991, the CDC had reported 179,136 cases of AIDS in the U.S. In 1991,
AIDS was the second leading cause of death among men ages 25 through 44 and the sixth leading
cause of death among women ages 15 through 44. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of
Health and Human Services, Update: Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS Among Per-
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these issues become even more difficult when the iatrogenic injury re-
sults not from the patient's having received treatment below the profes-
sional standard of care (which is the usual grist for the malpractice
mill) but from an infectious condition of the HCP.
5
Considerable public attention has been directed to patients who
have been exposed to the risk of AIDS by HIV-positive HCPs.6 It is
sons Aged 25-44-United States, 1990 and 1991, 42 Morbidity and Mortality Wkly. Rep. 481, 481
(1993) ("Update Mortality"). Further, the World Health Organization estimates that eight to ten
million adults and one million children worldwide are currently infected with HIV. See Centers for
Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First
10 Years, 40 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 357, 357 (1991). By March 31, 1993, the actual
total number of reported AIDS cases in the U.S. was 289,320. Illinois Dep't of Public Health,
National AIDS Surveillance Statistics, AIDS/HIV Surveillance Rep. 1, 11 (June 30, 1993).
The National Commission on AIDS reported that as of 1990, 75,000 people had died of AIDS
and predicted the epidemic to worsen in the 1990s. The Commission responded by calling for more
definitive rules from the government and the enactment of legislation prohibiting discrimination
against HIV-infected individuals. National Commission on AIDS, Report Number Two: Leader-
ship, Legislation and Regulation (1990) (Pamphlet) (on file with the Author). In 1991, 29,850 died
with HIV infection in the United States. Update Mortality at 481. See also Warner C. Greene,
AIDS and the Immune System, 269 Sci. Am. 98, 99 (Sept. 1993), for an analysis of the risks posed
by the AIDS virus; Greene reports that the total number of expected cases of HIV infection by the
year 2000 has been estimated to vary from 40 million to over 110 million (approximately 2% of the
world's population).
5. The ethical issues are compounded for infected HCPs because disclosing their condition
could mean the loss of their professional livelihood. Infected HCPs thus face a "moral" dilemma:
placing patients at risk to preserve their professional careers. The legal issues that arise when a
patient is infected by an HCP include whether a remedy should be provided, the nature of that
remedy, and the type of damages for which such patients should be compensated. The public
policy issues center around the need to contain the AIDS epidemic and protect patients against
exposure while continuing to provide access to health care and preserve the basic rights of HCPs.
6. Newsweek polled a representative sample of 618 adults in order to measure public aware-
ness of AIDS in the health care profession. In response to the question, "Which of the following
kinds of health care workers should be required to tell patients if they are infected with the AIDS
virus?," 95% responded that surgeons should reveal this information, compared to 94% for "all
physicians," 94% for dentists, and 90% for "all health-care workers." The poll had a margin of
error of 5%. See Barbara Kantrowitz, Doctors and AIDS, Newsweek 48, 51 (July 1, 1991). Addi-
tionally, 65% of those polled said that they would discontinue treatment with a health care worker
if they knew that worker was infected with the AIDS virus. Id. at 52. Further, 63% said that a
surgeon with AIDS should be forbidden to practice. Id. at 54. See also Betsy A. Lehman, AIDS
Tests for Health Caregivers?, Boston Globe (Science & Tech. section) 27 (Aug. 10, 1992) (discuss-
ing public opinion polls in which most interviewees responded that they would want to know if
their health care provider was infected with the HIV virus).
The percentage of HCPs infected with the AIDS virus is approximately the same as that of
the general work force. Based on Bureau of Labor Statistics data available in 1988, Larry Gostin
indicates that the percentage of HCPs with AIDS is 5.4%, compared to 5.7% in the general work
force. Larry Gostin, Hospital Health Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the
Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48 Md. L. Rev. 12, 15 n.22 (1989). Through June 30,
1990, there were 5425 HCPs with AIDS in the United States. See Mary E. Chamberland, Health
Care Workers with AIDS-National Surveillance Update, 266 JAMA 3459 (1991). By June 30,
1992, the number had risen to 8467, so that HCPs represented 4.8% of the known 176,447 AIDS
cases reported to the CDC. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services,
Facts About HIV/AIDS and Health-Care Workers, HIV/AIDS Prevention 1 (July 1992). The
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difficult to be unmoved by the tragic example of Kimberly Bergalis and
five other patients who contracted AIDS after being treated by a den-
tist who died of AIDS shortly thereafter.' The public outcry of "Physi-
cian, heal thyself' 8 was immediate, as were governmental proposals for
dealing with the perceived problem.9 Responses from various interest
CDC estimates that of 4.5 million HCPs in' the U.S., approximately 360 surgeons, 1,200 dentists,
5,000 physicians, and 35,000 other HCPs are HIV-infected. Lehman, Boston Globe at 27.
7. Ms. Bergalis, who was first treated by Dr. Acer in December of 1987, was diagnosed with
AIDS in 1989. After Dr. Acer died of an AIDS-related cancer in 1990, Ms. Bergalis publicly dis-
closed her condition. She died on December 8, 1991, at the age of 23. See Mike Williams, AIDS
Nightmare Ends in Death: Kimberly Bergalis Dies in Her Sleep at 23, Atlanta J. & Const. Al
(Dec. 9, 1991). See also A Death Not in Vain; But Don't Draw Wrong Conclusions from Kimberly
Bergalis Case, L.A. Times B6 (Dec. 10, 1991); Bruce Lamber, Kimberly Bergalis Is Dead at 23;
Symbol of Debate Over AIDS Tests, N.Y. Times D9 (Dec. 9, 1991); Centers for Disease Control,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Update: Transmission of HIV Infection During an
Invasive Dental Procedure-Florida, 40 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 21, 23-25 (1991) (dis-
cussing the DNA sequencing procedure used to trace the virus in order to prove accurately the
transmission of the virus from Dr. Acer to Ms. Bergalis and four other patients). The sixth patient
of Dr. Acer was not diagnosed with AIDs until being tested for the military in late 1992. Florida
Dentist Linked to 6th AIDS Victim, Chi. Trib. 7 (May 7, 1993).
8. Luke 4:23 (King James). The betrayal of trust is compounded when a physician places
self-interest over patient welfare.
9. Congress responded by proposing a mandatory AIDS testing law for HCPs. See generally
137 Cong. Rec. H5203-05 (daily ed. June 26, 1991) (discussing "Kimberly Bergalis Patients and
Health Providers Protection Act of 1991"); 137 Cong. Rec. H5590-91 (daily ed. July 17, 1991)
(discussing "The AIDS Pandemic"); 137 Cong. Rec. S10833-37 (daily ed. July 25, 1991) (discussing
"Mandatory Disclosure of HIV Status for Health Care Workers"); 137 Cong. Rec. E3015-16 (daily
ed. Sept. 12, 1991) (discussing "HIV Dilemma in Health Care Workplace").
The Helms Amendment to the mandatory AIDS testing bill, Amendment No. 734, proposed
that any health care worker "who knows he is HIV positive and intentionally provides a medical or
dental treatment to a patient without prior disclosure will be imprisoned not less than 10 years,
fined $10,000, or both." See 137 Cong. Rec. S9778 (daily ed. July 11, 1991); 137 Cong. Rec. S10331,
10332 (daily ed. July 18, 1991). Senator Helms's second proposal would have allowed health care
workers to test patients for AIDS without their consent. See 137 Cong. Rec. Sl1381 (daily ed. July
30, 1991); Thomas E. Margolis, Health Care Workers and AIDS: HIV Transmission in the Health
Care Environment, 13 J. Legal Med. 357, 363-68 (1992) (suggesting that more support for the
Helms amendments existed based on the emphasis on patient testing because at the time of the
amendments, five cases of HIV transmission from doctor to patient had been reported, as com-
pared to 47 cases of transmission from patient to health care worker).
Kimberly Bergalis endorsed the bill sponsored by Rep. Dannemeyer of California; the Dan-
nemeyer bill was similar to the Helms Amendment, but eliminated the prison term provisions. See
Joyce Price, Lawmakers Reject AIDS Amendment, Wash. Times A5 (Sept. 28, 1991). The amend-
ments were defeated on Sept. 28, 1991. Id. See generally Jeffrey W. Cavender, Note, AIDS in the
Health Care Setting: The Congressional Response to the Kimberly Bergalis Case, 26 Ga. L. Rev.
539 (1992).
As of early 1992, only six- states-California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, and
Texas-had passed laws concerning HIV-infected HCPs. Margolis, 13 J. Legal Med. at 385. In
Illinois, for example, the Health Department is permitted to inform patients of the infected condi-
tion of an HCP when that HCP is diagnosed with AIDS. 410 ILCS 325.5 (Smith-Hurd, 1993).
Additionally, Maryland, New Jersey, and New York provide for criminal sanctions against HCPs
who are HIV-infected and do not obtain informed consent from their patients before treatment.
Margolis, 13 J. Legal Med. at 386. For a lengthier discussion of various state proposals including
1420
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groups were equally swift and effective.'" Despite the flood of proposals
mandatory testing, adoption of CDC guidelines, and implementation of OSHA's universal precau-
tions, see id. at 386-88.
See also Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Recommen-
dations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus
to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly Rep.
(Supp. July 12, 1991) ("CDC, Recommendations'. The CDC determined that:
1. Infected [HCPs] who adhere to universal precautions and who do not perform invasive
procedures pose no risk for transmitting HIV or HBV to patients;
2. Infected [HCPs] who adhere to universal precautions and who perform exposure-prone
procedures pose a small risk for transmitting HBV to patients; and,
3. HIV is transmitted much less readily than HBV.
Id. at 1.
Based upon these considerations, the CDC recommended the following measures to minimize
the risk of HIV and HBV transmission:
1. All [HCPs] should adhere to universal precautions, including the appropriate use of hand
washing, protective barriers, and care in the use and disposal of needles and other sharp
instruments. [HCPs] who have exudative lesions or weeping dermatitis should refrain from all
direct patient care and from handling patient-care equipment and devices used in performing
invasive procedures until the condition resolves. [HCPs] should also comply with current
guidelines for disinfection and sterilization of reusable devices used in invasive procedures.
2. Currently available data provide no basis for recommendations to restrict the practice of
[HCPs] infected with HIV or HBV who perform invasive procedures not identified as expo-
sure-prone, provided the infected HCPs practice recommended surgical or dental techniques
and comply with universal precautions and current recommendations for sterilization/
disinfection.
3. Exposure-prone procedures should be identified by medical/surgical/dental organizations
and institutions at which the procedures are performed.
4. [HCPs] who perform exposure-prone procedures should know their HIV anti-body status..
5. [HCPs] who are infected with HIV or HBV... should not perform exposure-prone proce-
dures unless they have sought counsel from an expert review panel and been advised under
what circumstances, if any, they may continue to perform these procedures. Such circum-
stances would include notifying prospective patients of the [HCP's] seropositivity before
they undergo exposure-prone procedures.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). For the CDC's general definition of exposure-prone
procedures, see id. at 4. For the CDC's definition of universal precautions, see note 204.
10. The following groups opposed the mandatory testing and disclosure of health care work-
ers' HIV status: the American Hospital Association; the American College of Physicians; the Amer-
ican Association of Nurse Anesthetists; the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists; the
American Dental Association; the Organization for Obstetric, Gynecologic, & Neonatal Nurses; the
Association of State and Territorial Health Officials; the United States Conference of Mayors; and
the ACLU. See 137 Cong. Rec. S10343-47 (daily ed. July 18, 1991).
The head of the CDC testified during congressional debates over the mandatory AIDS testing
bill that the CDC opposed mandatory AIDS testing for health care workers. See Teresa Riordan,
CDC Head Testifies Against Mandatory AIDS Testing of Doctors, Reuters (Sept. 19, 1991) (avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File). ActionAIDS, a non-profit organization, also opposed
mandatory testing, citing the low risk of transmission. See ActionAIDS Opposes Mandatory HIV
Testing of Health Care Workers, PR Newswire (Sept. 26, 1991) (available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Omni File). While opposing mandatory testing, citing the low risk of transmission, the
American Dental Association (ADA) recommended in 1991 that HIV-infected dentists stop per-
forming invasive procedures or disclose their HIV status. See ADA Opposes Mandatory HIV Test-
ing, Challenges Risk Estimates, PR Newswire (Feb. 21, 1991) (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Omni File). Compare Dental Group Rejects Mandatory AIDS Testing, UPI BC Cycle (July 16,
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and recommendations, however, there appears to be an absence of po-
litical will to address the problem; the task therefore is thrown to the
legal system." In this instance, the law of torts will be asked to provide
the theories of recovery for patients who are infected with HIV by
HCPs.'2
The doctrine of informed consent likely will be advanced to ad-
dress the issue of recovery.' 3 A critical concern of HCPs is that, if they
1991) (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File) (noting that the Academy of General Den-
tistry also rejected mandatory testing).
The American Medical Association (AMA) also rejected the proposal. See Michael L. Millen-
son, AMA Votes Down Mandatory AIDS Tests for Doctors, Chi. Trib. 1 (June 27, 1991) (news
section) (noting that at the same AMA policy-making house of delegates, a resolution was passed
to make it easier to test patients for the virus); Kim Painter and Kevin Johnson, AMA Rejects
Mandatory AIDS Testing, USA Today 1A (June 29, 1991). Compare Allan Parachini, AMA Urges
AIDS Reporting System; Would Tell Carriers' Partners; Endorses Mandatory Tests, L.A. Times
22 (June 20, 1987) (Part 1) (reporting that the AMA Board of Trustees endorsed mandatory test-
ing for blood donors, prisoners, and military personnel). But see Sanford F. Kuvin, AIDS Testing:
Make It Mandatory; Federal Rules Don't Go Far Enough to Protect Patients and Doctors from
Each Other, Newsday 67 (July 19, 1991) (Nassau and Suffolk edition) (indicating that the risk of
transmission is not insignificant and that the CDC's recommended universal precautions often fail,
and calling for the mandatory testing of physicians and patients undergoing invasive procedures,
citing the higher risk of transmission from patient to physician).
11. The "right to die" cases provide a recent example of a situation in which courts are
forced to make life or death decisions in the absence of legislative solutions. See, for example,
Judge Bambrick's "Footnote for the Legislature," imploring the legislature to address the right to
die issue, in Randolph v. City of New York, N.Y. L. J. at 6, 12 (Oct. 12, 1984) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct.
1, 1984), rev'd, 117 A.D.2d 44, 501 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1986), modified, 69 N.Y.2d 844, 507 N.E.2d 298
(1987). Another classic example of this phenomenon drawn from tort law is the adoption of com-
parative fault by some courts in the absence of legislative action. See, for example, Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 S.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of California, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d
1226 (1975). But see note 216 (citing recent state bills relating to informed consent issues).
12. The litigation process is well under way. Dr. Acer's insurance carrier settled Ms. Ber-
galis's claim for a reported $1 million. See Christine Woolsey, Insurers Face Claims by Patient of
Dentist Who Contracted AIDS, Bus. Ins. 22 (Feb. 25, 1991). Another former patient of Dr. Acer is
suing CIGNA Dental Health of Florida, a dentists' referral plan, alleging that he contracted the
AIDS virus as the result of Dr. Acer's negligence. Id. The patient alleged vicarious liability, corpo-
rate negligence, and negligent misrepresentation against CIGNA, which approved dentists and
"represented [them] to be ... competent to practice dentistry in all respects." Driskill v. CIGNA
Dental Health of Florida, Inc., No. 91-177 (19th Jud. Cir., Martin County, Fla. 1991). Other pa-
tients of Dr. Acer may follow a similar course. See Former 'Teacher of the Year' Contracts AIDS
Virus from Dentist, UPI BC Cycle (Feb. 21, 1991) (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File).
Three class action suits were filed on behalf of more than 50 former patients against another den-
tist who died of AIDS. Two claims were settled for a reported $300,000. See David Beasley, Courts,
Atlanta J. & Const. D6 (June 14, 1992).
Recently, HCPs and hospitals have been sued on numerous occasions for transmitting the
AIDS virus to patients through blood transfusions. In 1991 and 1992, seven judgments resulted in
nearly $51 million in damages to these patients. See Mike McKee, AIDS Patients Are Suing Doc-
tors and Winning, N.J. L. J. 4 (June 1, 1992).
13. See generally W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts 120, 189-90
(West, 5th ed. 1984) ("Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts"); Pegalis and Wachsman, American Law
of Medical Malpractice at §§ 4.1-4.3 (cited in note 3) (discussing physician and hospital liability
for failure to obtain informed consent); Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision,
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are required to inform patients of their HIV status, they not only will
be subject to liability but also will be placed in a position of "moral
jeopardy," when such disclosure will result in the probable loss or se-
vere restriction of their professional lives. 14 Issues relating to the liabil-
ity of HCPs to patients are addressed in Part II of this Article.
The converse of the situation discussed above-HCPs infected by
patients-has not received the same degree of notoriety,15 although the
probability of patient-to-physician infection appears to be significantly
greater.1 6 The exposure of HCPs to HIV-infected patients should accel-
erate with increases in the number and geographic distribution of peo-
39 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 137 (1977) (discussing shortcomings of the informed consent doctrine in medi-
cal practice); Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected
Interest, 95 Yale L. J. 219 (1985) (analyzing the failure of the informed consent doctrine to protect
patients adequately). See also President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research, Making Healthcare Decisions: The Ethical
and Legal Implications of Informed Consent in the Patient-Practitioner Relationship (1982);
Ruth R. Faden and Tom L. Beauchamp (with Nancy M.P. King), A History and Theory of In-
formed Consent (Oxford U., 1986).
14. Other examples of "moral jeopardy" faced by health care professionals include recom-
mending procedures or tests of marginal utility to patients with the knowledge that these services
will be reimbursed, referring patients to laboratories or other facilities in which the HCP has a
financial interest, and failing to report a colleague who is a substance abuser or has other physical
or mental disabilities that could adversely affect patients for fear of professional repercussions.
15. Boulais v. Lustig, No. BC038105 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993) (copy on file with the Author), in
which a jury returned an award of $102,500 in favor of a surgical technician who was exposed to
HIV by a patient who failed to disclose that she had AIDS, has received considerable media cover-
age. See notes 117-23 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this case.
An interesting aspect of the Boulais case is that the defendant patient filed a countersuit
against the plaintiff technician and her attorneys for invasion of privacy, alleging "malicious dis-
closure" because they publicized her name rather than using an alias such as "Jane Doe." See
Terry Pristin, Nurse Cut by Scalpel Names HIV-Positive Patient, Who Countersues, L.A. Times
B3 (Oct. 30, 1991). The California Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal from an order deny-
ing dismissal of the invasion of privacy claim. Boulais v. Lustig, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 65 at *1 (1992).
See also Philip Hager, High Court Lets AIDS Patient Continue Privacy Invasion Suit, L.A. Times
A27 (Jan. 10, 1992).
16. The CDC estimates that the risk of HIV transmission Jo an HCP after percutaneous
exposure to HIV-infected blood is, on the average, .3%. CDC, Recommendations at 3 (cited in note
9). Although the risk of an HCP's transmitting HIV to a patient during a single invasive procedure
has not been extensively studied, the CDC estimates the probability of a patient contracting the
disease from an HIV-positive surgeon to be between .0024% (1 in 41,667) and .00024% (1 in
416,667). Id. The probability that an HIV-positive surgeon will infect a patient in seven years of
practicing medicine ranges from 1% to 18.3%. Id. See also Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't
of Health and Human Services, Estimates of the Risk of Endemic Transmission of Hepatitis B
Virus and Human Immunodeficiency Virus to Patients by the Percutaneous Route During Inva-
sive Surgical and Dental Procedure at 5, 6 (Draft) (Jan. 30, 1991) (summarizing selected risks in
the health care setting) ("CDC, Estimates').
The risk of a surgeon's contracting HIV from an infected patient in a single operation has
been estimated to range from .022% (1 in 4,500) to .0007% (1 in 130,000). See Michael D. Hagen et
al., Routine Preoperative Screening for HIV: Does the Risk to the Surgeon Outweigh the Risk to
the Patient?, 259 JAMA 1357, 1358 (1988). These figures are based upon an estimated rate of
HIV-positive patients of between 1 in 10,000 and 15 in 10,000; a risk of infection from a skin
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ple with HIV disease 17 (ranging from asymptomatic HIV infection to
full-blown AIDS)."8
Obviously HCPs consent to treat their patients.19 A patient's po-
tential liability for exposing an HCP to HIV, however, should be based
on whether the HCP's consent was informed and whether the HCP as-
sumed any risk associated with treatment knowingly and voluntarily.
20
puncture of between 3 in 10,000 and 90 in 10,000; and the probability that a surgeon will sustain a
significant skin cut in 1 out of 40 operations. Thus:
1 X 90 = 1 - 2.2 X 10-4
40 10,000 4500
1 X 3 _ 1 -7.6 10 -6
40 10,000 130,000
The risk of infection to the surgeon from an HIV-positive patient is approximately 3 to 9 times
greater than the risk of the patient's being infected by the surgeon:
2.22 X 10-4 to 7.6 X 10.6 - 9.25 to 3.3
2.38 X 10-
3 to 2.3 X 10.6
17. In 1981, 189 cases of AIDS were reported to the CDC, with 76% of the reported cases
coming from New York and California. In 1990, nearly two-thirds of the 43,000-plus cases reported
were from outside New York and California, representing all U.S. states, the District of Columbia,
and the U.S. territories. See Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Ser-
vices, The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First Ten Years, 40 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 358,
358 (1991). See also Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, AIDS
Quarterly Map, 41 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 265, 281 (1991) (showing the geographic
distribution of AIDS cases reported to the CDC from April 1991 through March 1992; District of
Columbia, New York, Florida, New Jersey, California, Georgia, Maryland, Nevada, Louisiana,
Texas, Hawaii, Connecticut, and Massachusetts represented the jurisdictions with the highest
number of cases reported per 100,000 population). The geographical distribution of the number of
reported AIDS cases changed slightly from January 1992 through December 1992. The leading
states in cases reported per 100,000 population were District of Columbia, New York, Florida,
California, New Jersey, Maryland, Delaware, Georgia, Connecticut, Nevada, Texas, Louisiana, and
Illinois. Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Quarterly AIDS
Map, 42 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. 67, 67 (1993).
18. The legislative history of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (1988 & Supp. 1991), uses the term "HIV disease." "People with HIV diseases are individu-
als who have any condition along the full spectrum of HIV infection-asymptomatic HIV infec-
tion, symptomatic HIV infection or full-blown AIDS." 136 Cong. Rec. H4623 (daily ed. July 13,
1990) (statement of Rep. Owens). See Chai R. Feldblum, Workplace Issues: HIV and Discrimina-
tion, in AIDS Agenda 271, 277-78 & n.35 (1992). See also note 188 for further discussion of the
ADA.
19. HCPs consent to their contact with patients by accepting them as patients and treating
them. Consent on the part of HCPs to exposure to AIDS, however, should not be implied by the
HCP's general consent to treat a patient. Rather, this Article argues that the law should impose
upon patients a duty to disclose material risks, such as HIV-positive status, to their HCPs, just as
the doctrine of informed consent imposes an analogous duty upon HCPs.
20. "The defense of assumption of risk is in fact quite narrowly confined ... first, the plain-
tiff must know that the risk is present, and he must further understand its nature; and second, his
choice to incur it must be free and voluntary." Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 486-87 (cited in
note 13). The defense may also require a third element-that the plaintiff act unreasonably under
the circumstances. This third element could result in an overlap with the defense of contributory
or comparative negligence. See id. at 497-98.
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Accordingly, situations in which HCPs know that patients are infected
should be distinguished from situations in which they do not or cannot
reasonably know.21
In an action by an HCP against a patient, the central issue is
whether a duty should be imposed upon patients to inform HCPs of
their infectious status. Imposing such a duty on patients would extend
the scope of tort law well beyond that presently recognized under the
doctrine of informed consent. If tort law imposes a duty upon patients
to inform HCPs of their HIV status, then an appropriate standard must
be adopted to determine if a breach of that duty has occurred. A causal
connection must then be established between the patient's failure to
inform and any injury (particularly infection) suffered by the HCP. The
causation issue in a patient-to-HCP infection case is considerably more
difficult than in a traditional informed consent case, in which the analy-
sis takes the form: But for the failure of the HCP to obtain informed
consent, would the patient have consented to the treatment? In the re-
verse situation (in which a patient's failure to disclose injures an HCP),
it must be established that the HCP would not have undertaken the
procedure (raising significant ethical and legal issues) had the patient
disclosed his or her condition, or that the HCP would have employed a
higher degree of care had the patient disclosed (raising issues of the
HCP's ability to do so). Part III of this Article will address these issues
in the context of the proposed doctrine of reverse informed consent.
Part IV will examine the limitations of the civil liability system in
applying tort theories that would impose such reciprocal duties to dis-
close on HCPs and patients. This Article considers whether the goals of
tort law-compensation and deterrence-can be achieved effectively
and whether public or private measures may provide more effective-or
at least complementary-safeguards in the public interest.
The general issue of whether HCPs and patients should have du-
ties to warn one another of infected status is, of course, not limited to
HIV disease, although HIV is the most topical instance. Other infec-
tious and contagious diseases are considerably more virulent-for ex-
ample, hepatitis virus B (HBV)2 s and tuberculosis (TB) (especially a
21. If an HCP has actual knowledge of a patient's HIV status, she could approach the risk
knowingly, voluntarily, and unreasonably (that is, she could fail to use universal precautions). Fur-
thermore, contributory or comparative negligence may be a defense when a patient infects an
HCP, if the HCP does not have actual knowledge of the patient's HIV status but should have
known or discovered it.
22. The CDC estimates the risk of HBV transmission to an HCP after percutaneous expo-
sure to HIV-positive blood to be approximately 30%. See CDC, Recommendations at 3 (cited in
note 9). See also John H. Lemmer, M.D., Hepatitis B as an Occupational Disease of Surgeons, 159
Surgery Gynecology Obstetrics 91, 91-100 (1984) (reporting that the overall career risk of a sur-
geon's suffering acute symptomatic hepatitis is between 10 and 20%; the risk that a surgeon will
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treatment-resistant strain that currently is on the increase in certain
populations).23 This Article attempts to deal with the more generalized
issue of exposure of patients and HCPs to material risks associated with
the infectious, contagious, or otherwise unreasonably dangerous 24 physi-
cal conditions of the other.
II. DIRECT INFORMED CONSENT: PATIENT VERSUS HEALTH CARE
PROFESSIONAL
Before approaching the question of whether patients have a duty to
disclose material risks associated with their care to HCPs, it is neces-
sary to establish firmly that the doctrine of informed consent applies to
infected HCPs, requiring them to disclose their infected status to their
patients. In the traditional case involving consent to treatment, the
logic of informed consent is straightforward: Had the patient been in-
become a chronic carrier during 40 years of practice is approximately 4%). See generally Centers
for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Protection Against Viral Hepati-
tis, 39 Mobidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep. RR-2, 17-21 (1990) ("CDC, Protection') (discussing rec-
ommendations for prevention of Hepatitis B transmission after accidental percutaneous exposure).
Another study reports: "In the case in which the susceptible dentist presumably is unaware of his
patient's serostatus, the cumulative annual risk of infection is 57 times as great for HBV as for
HIV (0.34% versus 0.006%)." Eli L Capilouto, What Is the Dentist's Occupational Risk of Becom-
ing Infected with Hepatitis B or the Human Immunodeficiency Virus?, 82 Am. J. Pub. Health
587, 588 (1992). The report also indicates that "the risk of dying from HBV infection is 1.7 times
greater than the risk of HIV infection, for which mortality is almost certain." Id. at 587. From
infected doctor to patient, the risk of transmission probability ranges from .24% (1 in 417) to
.024% (1 in 4167). See CDC, Estimates at 7 (cited in note 16).
23. See, for example, David L. Wheeler, Scientists Gear Up to Fight Tuberculosis as Disease
Returns in Drug-Resistant Form, Chron. Higher Educ. A-7 (Sept. 9, 1992) (noting that drug resis-
tant strains of TB have been reported in 36 states and the District of Columbia).
24. The use of the term "unreasonably dangerous patient" is not intended in any way to be
offensive or insensitive to sick people in general or to people with AIDS or other infectious or
contagious diseases in particular. The term merely identifies patients who may be unreasonably
dangerous to HCPs because of the latter's unawareness of material risks attendant to their care.
The point of the term is that the patients are unreasonably dangerous because they have not
informed their HCPs of their infected status. In other words, they would be only reasonably dan-
gerous if their HCPs were duly informed. Such information would enable HCPs to deal with pa-
tients according to their particular physical conditions. However, the conclusion that HCPs may be
considered only reasonably dangerous when they inform patients of their infected status may not
be entirely defensible, as discussed below. See notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
The "unreasonably dangerous" language in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (ALI,
1965) ("Restatement") on products liability provides an appropriate analogy. Strict liability is the
general rule for manufacturing and design defects; however, a negligence standard generally is im-
posed for notice or warning defects, requiring that the manufacturer know or should have known
of the risks presented by the product without the notice. See Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at
697-98, 700-01 (cited in note 13). The proposed revision of § 402A for the Restatement (Third) of
Torts makes the negligence standard express for warning defects and eliminates the "unreasonably
dangerous" language qualifying "defective conditions" in the present version. See James A. Hen-
derson, Jr. and Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512, 1514 (1992) (quoting and analyzing the proposed revision).
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formed of the material risks of the treatment proposed by the HCP, the
patient would not have consented to the treatment and therefore would
have avoided any injury as a consequence of the risky treatment." An
HCP's duty to inform her patients of any material risks associated with
a proposed course of treatment would appear to be easily imposed by
the nature of the HCP-patient relationship, generally considered a fidu-
ciary relationship, 26 or as an implied term of the contractual relation-
ship between the parties.
A. The Basic Elements of a Cause of Action Based on Lack of
Informed Consent
This subpart introduces the basic elements in a cause of action
based upon lack of informed consent. These elements are discussed
throughout Part II in the analysis of HCPs' duty to disclose.
First, informed consent requires only that HCPs disclose "mate-
rial" risks. Under the majority rule, whether a particular risk is "mate-
rial" is determined by the professional (sometimes called
"paternalistic") standard, which is derived from the customs of the
HCP community. 2 A minority view holds that, because the professional
standard undermines the principle of patient autonomy, a "reasonable
person" standard should be applied. Under this standard, materiality is
determined according to what a reasonable person would need to know
in order to make an informed decision to consent to the proposed
treatment. 9
25. See Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 191 (cited in note 13).
26. See Fowler V. Harper, Fleming James, Jr., and Oscar S. Gray, 2 The Law of Torts § 7.14
at 474 n.11 (Little, Brown, 2d ed. 1986): "It is commonly said that a fiduciary relationship exists
between physician and patient.... This has occasionally led to the conclusion that physicians may
be subject to liability in fraud for nondisclosure of material information, apart from liability in
malpractice or battery for failure to obtain informed consent."
In the context of informed consent, the D.C. Circuit explained: "[W]e ourselves have found 'in
the fiducial qualities of [the physician-patient] relationship the physician's duty to reveal to the
patient that which in his best interests it is important that he should know'." Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (quoting Emmett v. Eastern Dispensary & Cas. Hosp.,
396 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1967)). See generally Edmund D. Pelegrino, Robert M. Veatch, and
John P. Langan, eds., Ethics, Trust, and the Professions (Georgetown, 1993).
27. See Barry R. Furrow, et. al., Health Law 284-86 (West, 2d ed. 1991); Pegalis and Wachs-
man, American Law of Medical Malpractice §§ 2.3-2.4 (cited in note 3).
28. See Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 190-91 (cited in note 13). A majority of states
have enacted statutory standards of informed consent. See Judith Areen, et al., Law, Science &
Medicine 384 n.4 (Foundation, 1984). See also Mark S. Rhodes, Informed Consent, in 2 Louisell
and Williams, Medical Malpractice at 22.18-22.68 (cited in note 3) (summarizing the views of
the various states).
29. See Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 191 (cited in note 13); Canterbury, 454 F.2d at
782 n.27. See also Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979) (holding that "[a] risk is
material if it would be likely to affect patient's decision").
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The American Medical Association (AMA) and other professional
societies have adopted resolutions requiring that patients be informed.
3 0
It appears clear, according to various surveys, that patients would want
to know of the infectious status of HCPs before consenting to treatment
by an infected HCP.31 Hence, according to either of these standards,
the infectious status of the HCP is material and subject to disclosure.
Additionally, in a cause of action based upon lack of informed con-
sent, a causal relationship must exist between the HCP's failure to se-
cure the patient's informed consent and the injury suffered by the
patient. The majority rule on causation asks whether a reasonable per-
son would have consented to the proposed treatment had he or she
been informed of the attendant risks.2 The minority rule is a subjective
one-whether this particular patient would have consented to the pro-
cedure.3 3 According to both or either of these standards, a fact-finder
could reasonably conclude that a patient would not have consented to
treatment after having been informed of the infected status of his or
her HCP.
The final element in a cause of action based upon lack of informed
consent is that the patient's injury must be of the kind posed by the
undisclosed risk. 4 In the case of nondisclosure of the infectious status
of an HCP, the most obvious injury would be that the patient contracts
the undisclosed infection. 5 If infection does not occur, injury in the
30. Both the American Medical Association and the American Dental Association have is-
sued statements indicating that HIV-infected physicians and dentists should refrain from perform-
ing invasive procedures or disclose their seropositive status to patients. See American Medical
Association, Statement on HIV Infected Physicians (Jan. 17, 1991) (copy on file with the Author);
American Dental Association, Interim Policy on HIV-Infected Dentists, 122 J. Am. Dental Associ-
ation 8, 8-9 (Feb. 1991). See also Karen C. Lieberman and Arthur R. Derse, HIV-Positive Health
Care Workers and the Obligation to Disclose, 13 J. Legal Med. 333, 338-40 (1992) (discussing the
positions of various professional organizations).
31. The Newsweek poll shows that approximately 9 out of 10 Americans believe that their
physicians should tell them if they have AIDS. Further, 65% of those polled would discontinue
treatment with HCPs known to have AIDS. See Kantrowitz, Newsweek at 52 (cited in note 6).
Going one step further, a Texas poll asked, "Would you continue seeing your family doctor or
dentist if you know one of his or her patients had AIDS?"; 39% of those polled responded they
would not. See Candace Windel, Facing Social Consequences of AIDS; HIV Sways Perception of
Doctors, Houston Chron. 1 (Oct. 27, 1991) (state section). See generally Patricia A. Marshall, et al.,
Patients' Fear of Contracting the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome from Physicians, 150
Arch. Intern. Med. 1501 (1990).
32. See Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 191 (cited in note 13).
33. Id. at 191-92.
34. As stated in Scott, 606 P.2d at 559:
The final element of [an informed consent] cause of action is that of injury. The risk must
actually materialize and plaintiff must have been injured as a result of submitting to the
treatment. Absent occurrence of the undisclosed risk, a physician's failure to reveal its possi-
bility is not actionable.
35. This was the unfortunate situation with respect to Kimberly Bergalis and the other five
patients infected by their dentist. See note 7 and accompanying text.
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form of mental distress based on the fear of contracting the infection
will likely be alleged."
B. Arguments For and Against a Duty to Disclose
One argument against the applicability of the informed consent
doctrine is that the infected status of the HCP presents such a low risk
of infecting patients that it is not "material" and need not be disclosed,
as is the case with any other low probability risk.37 While the risk of
patient infection may be small (estimated by the CDC to be between
one in 41,667 and one in 416,667 in the case of HIV), 5 the loss suffered
by the patient may be life itself. With respect to other infections (for
example, HBV), which may not be life-threatening in all cases,3" the
probability of infection is significantly greater (estimated to be between
one in 417 and one in 4167).'" Moreover, risk of infection is not the only
consideration. As indicated in Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at
Princeton,4 1 an accident (surgical in Behringer) risks exposure of the
patient, thus subjecting the patient to months or even years of testing.
42
The court in Behringer applied a risk-benefit analysis and concluded
that the risk of HIV infection being transmitted from surgeon to pa-
tient, "however small, does exist;" the potential loss of the patient's life
is so great a risk as to mandate disclosure. 3
In any event, the probability that an infected HCP will infect a
patient would appear to fall within the range of risks considered "mate-
rial" 44 in informed consent cases even when the loss is substantially less
36. Recognition of mental distress damage is more problematic. This issue will be addressed
after considering various arguments that may be raised against the applicability of the doctrine of
informed consent in regard to infected HCPs. See notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
37. See Mark Barnes, et al., The HIV-Infected Health Care Professional: Employment Poli-
cies and Public Health, 18 L. Med. & Health Care 311, 323-24 (1990). Note that this article was
written prior to the disclosure that six patients had been infected with HIV transmitted by their
dentist. See note 7 and accompanying text.
38. See CDC, Estimates at 7 (cited in note 16).
39. The mortality rate (or case-fatality rate) for HBV is 1.4%. See CDC, Protection at 7
(cited in note 22). But see Lawrence J. Scheiderman and Robert M. Kaplan, Fear of Dying and
HIV Infections vs. Hepatitis B Infection, 82 Am. J. Pub. Health 584, 584 (1992) (explaining that
while there is a 25% chance of hepatitis B infection following accidental exposure, about 5% of
those die from either fulminant or chronic progressive disease).
40. See CDC, Estimates at 7 (cited in note 16). The estimated risk of transmission of HBV
from HCPs to patients is 100 times that of HIV. In another study, the risk of heart surgery pa-
tients acquiring symptomatic acute HBV from medical staff after surgery was 9 in 100,000 com-
pared to 25 in 100,000-the occupational risk of infection to surgeons. M.B. Prentice, et al,
Infection with Hepatitis B Virus After Open Heart Surgery, 304 Brit. Med. J. 761, 763 (1992).
41. 249 N.J. Super. 597, 592 A.2d 1251 (1991).
42. Id. at 1266 n.8, 1279.
43. Id. at 1280.
44. The Supreme Court of Texas has defined "materiality" as including "how the condition
manifests itself; the permanency of the condition caused by the risk; the known cures for the
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than catastrophic. For example, in Canterbury v. Spence, a one percent
risk of paralysis from a laminectomy was considered material.45 In Hid-
ding v. Williams, which also involved a laminectomy, a one in 200,000
risk of loss of bowel and bladder control was held to be material." In
Doe v. Johnston,7 which involved an HCP's failure to inform a patient
of the risk of contracting AIDS from a blood transfusion, the Iowa Su-
preme Court held that the issue of materiality of a risk is a jury ques-
tion. There was conflicting expert testimony in Johnston; one expert
stated the risk of contamination to be one in 250,000, while others re-
ported that it was between one in 100,000 and one in a million. 48
Furthermore, in terms of risk-utility analysis, a more compelling
case can be made for the materiality of disclosure of HCPs' infected
status than in the traditional informed-consent-to-treatment situation.
In the typical case, if HCPs provide patients with the information nec-
essary to secure the patients' informed consent, patients may choose to
(i) undertake the treatment with its perceived benefits in light of the
material risks disclosed, or (ii) forego the treatment, thereby avoiding
potential risks but also depriving themselves of potential benefits. In
contrast, patients who are informed of the infected status of an HCP
proposing a specific course of treatment need not forego the potential
benefits of the treatment. They may avoid the risk associated with that
particular infected HCP and obtain the benefits of the treatment from
an uninfected HCP.'9
One can argue that the doctrine of informed consent is limited to
material risks of the proposed treatment itself and does not extend to
condition; the seriousness of the condition; and the overall effect of the condition on the body."
Barclay v. Cambell, 704 S.W.2d 8, 10 (Tex. 1986). With respect to HIV, the condition manifests
itself by infection, the infection is permanent, no cures exist, and the effect is fatal.
45. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 795. In addition, some courts have held that a physician has a
duty under the doctrine of informed consent to warn of the risks of general anesthesia. See Fogal
v. Genesee Hosp., 344 N.Y.S.2d 552 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973); Brown v. Dahl, 41 Wash. App. 565, 705
P.2d 781 (1985). The CDC estimates the risk of death from general anesthesia to be 100 out of 1
million (.01%). See CDC, Estimates, Table 4 (cited in note 16).
46. 578 S.2d 1192, 1195 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
47. 476 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 1991). Compare Doe v. Johnston with Kozup v. Georgetown Univ.,
663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 851 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(stating that the risk of contracting HIV through blood transfusion was not material because in
1983 the known risk was considered to be almost non-existent-one in 3.5 million).
48. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d at 31.
49. Various commentators have made this point. See, for example, Gostin, 48 Md. L. Rev. at
23 (cited in note 6); Steven Eisenstat, The HIV Infected Health Care Worker: The New AIDS
Scapegoat, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. 301, 313 (1992); Gordon G. Keyes, Health Care Professionals with
AIDS: The Risk of Transmission Balanced Against the Interests of Professionals and Institu-
tions, 16 J.C. & U.L. 589, 603 n.114 (1990).
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the infectious condition of HCPs.50 This argument would, however, re-
quire a narrower reading of informed consent cases than is justified by
the policy underlying the doctrine. The court in Behringer rejected this
argument, quoting broad language from a traditional informed consent
case that required disclosure of "any attendant substantial risks '51 in
addition to risks of the treatment itself.5 2 In the influential informed
consent case Canterbury v. Spence,53 the court spoke in broad terms of
the duties of physicians, which extend beyond "proficiency in diagnosis
and therapy":
The cases demonstrate that the physician is under an obligation to communicate
specific information to the patient when the exigencies of reasonable care call for it.
Due care may require a physician perceiving symptoms of bodily abnormality to
alert the patient to the condition. It may call upon the physician confronting an
ailment which does not respond to his ministrations to inform the patient thereof.
It may command the physician to instruct the patient as to any limitations to be
presently observbd for his own welfare, and as to any precautionary therapy he
should seek in the future. It may oblige the physician to advise the patient of the
need for or desirability of any alternative treatment promising greater benefit than
that being pursued. Just as plainly, due care normally demands that the physician
warn the patient of any risks to his well-being which contemplated therapy may
involve.
6'
It would seem well within the underlying philosophy of Canterbury
to extend HCPs' duty of due care to include the obligation to advise
patients of their infected status. Since the doctrine of informed consent
is based upon the principle of patient autonomy, there would appear to
be little ethical or legal justification for excluding disclosure of the in-
50. See, for example, Larry Gostin, The HIV-Infected Health Care Professional: Public Pol-
icy, Discrimination and Patient Safety, 18 L. Med. & Health Care 303, 304 (1990); Eisenstat, 44
Rutgers L. Rev. at 313-14 (cited in note 49). The duty of HCPs who have an infectious condition to
inform their patients and to take precautions against spreading the infection was recognized nearly
150 years ago. In Piper v. Menifee, 51 Ky. 465 (1851), the court held that a physician infected with
smallpox was prima facie liable to a patient who contracted the disease through him. The court
stated:
Suppose a physician, knowing that he has an infectious disease, continues to visit his patients
without apprising them of the fact, and without proper precautions on his own part, and thus
communicates the disease to one of them? Clearly the physician thus acting would be guilty
of a breach of duty, and of his implied undertaking to his patient, which, whether it be re-
garded in the light of carelessness, or negligence, or fraud, would render him liable for the
consequent damage, including as well the suffering and danger and loss of time, as the ex-
pense necessarily occasioned by the second disease, thus produced by his own wrongful act.
Id. at 468.
51. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1281 (quoting Largey v. Rothman, 110 N.J. 204, 208, 540 A.2d 504
(1988), which held that informed consent required the physician to inform the plaintiff of the risks
in undergoing a biopsy procedure).
52. Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1281. The Behringer court, in finding the risk of harm to patients
from HCPs to be material, stated, "[T]he risks can foreseeably include a needlestick or scalpel cut
and, even with universal precautions can result in an exchange of the surgeon's blood." Id.
53. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
54. Id. at 781 (footnotes omitted).
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fected status of HCPs if that status presents a material risk bearing
upon whether a reasonable patient so informed would consent to that
HCP's proceeding with the treatment.
55
Moreover, it would be difficult for courts to limit the scope of the
HCP's duty to disclose material risks associated with treatment while
imposing upon HCPs a duty to disclose material risks associated with
their own patients to third parties who may foreseeably be exposed to
the patients. In the seminal case Tarasoff v. Regents of University of
California,5" the court imposed a duty on a psychiatrist to warn a po-
tential victim whom his patient had threatened with violence, although
such a warning may entail a breach of the patient's confidence.51 In ear-
lier cases, courts had imposed a duty on physicians to warn family
members of the potential risks associated with the infectious condition
of their patients. 8 This duty was imposed even when the physician neg-
ligently had failed to diagnose the infectious condition of the patient.5 9
55. Larry Gostin argues that:
The doctrine of informed consent was developed to assist patients in making decisions about
the benefits and risks of medical treatments, and not to protect them against incompetent or
dangerous physicians. If a physician is impaired or there is a real risk of transmission of
infection to her patient, then this is a problem that should be remedied by professional stan-
dards and licensing requirements.
Gostin, 18 L. Med. & Health Care at 304 (cited in note 50). Aside from the notorious ineffective-
ness of sanctioning by professional and licensing authorities, it is unclear why patients should be
deprived of the decisionmaking power to avoid a risk carried by an infectious HCP that would not
otherwise be impoged on patients by competent treatment. See notes 68-78 and accompanying text
for further illustration of this point.
56. 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
57. The therapist is held to a professional standard of care in diagnosing whether the patient
presents a "serious danger of violence" requiring notification to the anticipated victim. Id. at 345.
58. See id. (citing cases dealing with the duty owed by physicians to family members). See,
for example, WoJnick v. Aluminum Co., 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (N.Y. 1959) (holding that a husband's
employer negligently failed to inform the plaintiff that her husband was diagnosed with tuberculo-
sis during a physical examination conducted at work); Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S.W.
612 (1921) (holding that a physician negligently advised that other children could be placed in the
same room with a child infected with typhoid fever); Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W.
663 (1919) (holding that a physician negligently advised the plaintiff that it was safe to visit her
daughter, knowing that the daughter had scarlet fever). See generally Diane A. Tomlinson, Com-
ment, Physicians with AIDS and Their Duty to Patients, 43 Fla. L. Rev. 561, 564-69 (1991) (dis-
cussing the above-mentioned cases).
59. See Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 344 (citing Jones v. Stankko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N.E. 456
(1928)). In Jones, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician had failed to diagnose a pa-
tient as having smallpox, and had assured her husband that it was safe to be around this patient;
in reliance, her husband contracted smallpox from the patient. Id. at 456-57. See also Molien v.
Kaiser Foundation Hosps., 167 Cal. Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (1980), in which the plaintiff's wife
was negligently diagnosed as having syphilis. The court concluded: "It is easily predictable that an
erroneous diagnosis of syphilis and its probable source would produce marital discord and resul-
tant emotional distress to a married patient's spouse .... " Id. at 817. But see Accounts Adjust-
ment Bureau v. Cooperman, 204 Cal. Rptr. 881 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (holding that parents failed to
state a cause of action for emotional distress when a doctor erroneously diagnosed their child as
having a brain disorder although the child only suffered from a mild learning disability).
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Infectious HCPs, in contrast, pose a direct risk to patients and may
indeed warn their patients of this risk without breaching a confidential
relationship. 0
Arguably, if HCPs must disclose their infectious status (in particu-
lar HIV) to patients, then other personal characteristics of the HCP
must also be disclosed,"1 a situation that would open the floodgates to
potential liability for nondisclosure of a vast array of personal charac-
teristics whenever the outcome of treatment is unfavorable.8 2 Imposing
a duty on HCPs to disclose their infectious status does not, however,
necessarily lead to the conclusion that a significantly broader duty to
disclose all characteristics to patients should be imposed. Those charac-
teristics that pose no material risks obviously need not be disclosed.
These may include genetic attributes such as gender or race, or personal
attributes such as religion or sexual orientation, none of which would be
related to competency.63
60. HCPs obviously owe no duty of confidentiality to themselves. In contrast, HCPs placed
under a duty to disclose their patients' dangerous conditions to third parties must breach their
patients' confidentiality for the benefit of the third parties.
61. See, for example, Eisenstat, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. at 313, 320 (cited in note 49) (arguing
that the doctrine of informed consent does not require negligent or alcoholic physicians or those
with HBV to reveal that status; thus, HIV-infected physicians also should not be required to re-
veal that information); Gostin, 18 L. Med. & Health Care at 306 (cited in note 50) (questioning
why restrictions should be placed on HIV-infected HCPs, when none are placed on HBV-infected
HCPs).
62. The argument would be that had the patient been informed that the HCP was a sub-
stance abuser, a Methodist, or a Cubs fan, the patient would not have consented to the treatment.
63. Certain of these characteristics, of course, would be obvious to patients and they would
be free to act on the basis of whim, caprice, or prejudice to decline to be treated by HCPs having
these particular characteristics. Some genetic attributes may be competency-based, for example,
being left-handed. One synonym for "left-handed" is "clumsy, awkward." Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary 682 (1990). President Clinton, during the 1992 presidential campaign, said,
"I am pretty clumsy at times. I never thought it had anything to do with being left-handed, but
that's something I could blame it on." ABC, Primetime Live (Oct. 1, 1992) (television broadcast)
(available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file). Researchers at Harvard Medical School and the
National Institute of Aging recently conducted a study on the mortality rates of left-handers ver-
sus right-handers in response to a study done in 1991. See Marcel E. Salive, Jack M. Guralnik, and
Robert S. Glynn, Left-handedness and Mortality, 83 Am. J. Pub. Health 265, 266 (1993). The
1991 study concluded that the average age at death of left-handers was nine years lower than that
of right-handers. The newer study criticized the methods of the older one, claiming that the meth-
ods led to severely biased results. Id. at 265. The new study concluded, consistent with two 1991
studies, that the studies "taken together ... strongly suggest that left-handedness is not associated
with an elevated risk of death." Id. at 266. Salive, one of the authors of the 1993 study, stated that
"[1]efties still may be more accident prone than righties, *but just aren't as likely to die as a result."
Tim Friend, Being Lefty May Not Be a Death Risk, USA Today 1A (Feb. 8, 1993) (interviewing
Marcel E. Salive). See also More Accidents in Left-Handed Children: Doctors, Reuters, AM Cycle
(May 6, 1992) (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File) (finding that left-handed boys were
twice as likely as right-handed ones to enter a trauma center for accidents and that those same
left-handed children were 1.8 times more likely to have been hospitalized previously for
treatment).
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The question whether the doctrine of informed consent should im-
pose a duty on HCPs to disclose characteristics that may impair their
competency to undertake certain treatments with due care is more sub-
tle. Those competency-based characteristics involving physical or
mental impairment may include substance abuse (for example, alcohol
or drugs),64 debilitating diseases (for example, Alzheimer's, AIDS-de-
mentia),e5 or susceptibility to error (for example, lack of skill, training,
or experience).26 With respect to competency-impaired HCPs, the doc-
trine of informed consent provides no additional theory of recovery be-
yond that of direct negligence. Competency-impaired HCPs must act
negligently before they can be held liable. Whether or not an HCP is
suffering from substance abuse, a debilitating disease, or accident
proneness, a causal connection must always exist between the alleged
negligence and the injury suffered. For example, if an operation is per-
formed by a surgeon with Alzheimer's disease and no injury occurs, the
patient has no cause of action. This fact should not be surprising, when
courts have found that even if a surgeon had not gone to medical school
64. One may question whether HCPs who smoke cigarettes are competency impaired. This
fact may be material to patients opposed to smoking regardless of whether it affects the HCP's
competency.
65. Alzheimer's disease is a chronic mental disorder involving "progressive, irreversible loss
of memory, deterioration of intellectual functions, apathy, speech and gait disturbances, and diso-
rientation." Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary at 76 (cited in note 1).
AIDS dementia complex (ADC) is a progressively incapacitating syndrome that affects at least
two-thirds of people with AIDS. There is a significant change between Stage 1 (mild) (during
which the person can perform all but the most demanding aspects of work although there is une-
quivocal evidence of impaired motor and intellectual function) and Stage 2 (moderate) (during
which the person can care for himself but cannot perform more complex aspects of daily life). See
Richard W. Price and Bruce J. Brew, The AIDS Dementia Complex, 158 J. Infectious Diseases
1079, 1081 (1988).
66. "Studies of accident-producing behavior, extending back well over a quarter of a century,
show that some individuals are more likely to have accidents than are people at large." Fowler V.
Harper and Fleming James, 2 The Law Of Torts § 11.4 at 734 (Little, Brown, 1956). See generally
Lynette Shaw and Herbert S. Sichel, Accident Proneness: Research in the Occurrence, Causation
and Prevention of Road Accidents (Pergamon, 1971). But see Harper, James, and Gray, The Law
of Torts § 11.4 at 94 n.16 (cited in note 26) (citing more recent studies that have questioned
accident-prone persons' impact on overall accident rates). See also Fleming James, Jr. and John J.
Dickinson, Accident Proneness and Accident Law, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 769, 770 (1950) (citing a study
estimating that 10% of workers may be responsible for 75% of accidents). James and Dickinson
conclude that in any accident situation, two elements should be considered: "the accident potential
of the situation and the reaction of the individual to that potential." Id. at 771. They identify the
following factors to be connected with accident-proneness: habits and skills, physical characteris-
tics, psychomotor characteristics, mental characteristics and attitudes, and age and experience. Id.
at 772. It might be highly material to patients undergoing surgery to know that there are a number
of outstanding claims or judgments for malpractice against a particular surgeon, or that the sur-
geon is "accident prone" or. has no training in the particular type of surgery to be performed, or
that the procedure is the first one to be attempted by the surgeon or by anyone.
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and was not licensed to practice medicine, a causal relationship must
still be shown between the surgeon's conduct and the injury sustained.8 1
C. The Causation Hurdle
If lack of informed consent is the theory on which a claim is based,
a patient must prove that his injury occurred as a consequence of a
nondisclosed material risk.68 Assume that a surgeon with Alzheimer's
disease fails to inform a patient of his ailment but otherwise completely
fulfills the duty to disclose all material risks of the procedure to be per-
formed. Further assume that during the course of the operation the sur-
geon negligently cuts a glove and there is an exchange of blood with the
patient. The operation otherwise is performed with due care; however,
one of the disclosed material risks does materialize. For the patient to
recover on the basis of direct negligence, the injury must be causally
related to the conduct of the surgeon. The exchange of blood produced
no injury; thus, a direct negligence cause of action would fail. Because
the surgeon disclosed all material risks, an informed consent cause of
action also would fail."
Contrast this with the following situation: A surgeon with AIDS
discloses all material risks of an operation but fails to inform the pa-
tient that the surgeon has AIDS. Assume, as in the previous example,
67. In the leading case of Brown v. Shyne, 242 N.Y. 176, 151 N.E. 197 (1926), the Court of
Appeals of New York refused to hold that it was negligent per se for the defendant, an unlicensed
chiropractor, to treat the plaintiff; the court required proof of causation: "In order to show that the
plaintiff has been injured by defendant's breach of the statutory duty, proof must be given that
defendant in such treatment did not exercise the care and skill which would have been exercised
by qualified practitioners within the state, and that such lack of skill and care caused the injury.
Failure to obtain a license as required by law gives rise to no remedy if it has caused no injury." Id.
at 199. See also Hardy v. Dahl, 210 N.C. 530, 187 S.E. 788, 791 (1936) (holding that the defendant,
who held himself out to be a doctor of "naturopathy," could not be found negligent as a matter of
law for failure to obtain a license as required by statute; rather, the plaintiff was required to prove
that the defendant did not exercise proper care in the treatment of the plaintiff); Janssen v. Mul-
der, 232 Mich. 183, 205 N.W. 159, 161 (1925) (holding that the unlicensed defendant chiropractor's
failure to obtain a license to practice was insufficient to sustain a malpractice charge; rather, the
plaintiff was required to show that the injury was due to the defendant's negligence or unskillful
treatment). Contrast Whipple v. Grandchamp, 261 Mass. 40, 158 N.E. 270, 272 (1927) (holding
that a chiropractor practicing in violation of the medical licensing statute was negligent as a mat-
ter of law).
68. See note 34 (quoting the causation requirement from Scott v. Bradford). In Canterbury
the physician failed to disclose the material risk of paralysis from a proposed laminectomy proce-
dure. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1972). If the patient had consented to the
procedure after being informed of the risk of loss of bowel and bladder control, he obviously would
have no grounds to allege lack of informed consent. The patient in such a situation would have to
prove that the loss of bowel and bladder control resulted from the physician's negligent perform-
ance of the laminectomy.
69. This reasoning assumes that the patient suffered no cognizable injury in the form of
mental distress upon learning that he was operated on by a surgeon with a debilitating disease.
That problem is discussed in notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
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that the surgeon negligently cuts a glove and a transmission of blood to
the patient occurs. Further, assume that after the operation the patient
discovers that he is HIV-positive. In this hypothetical, resort to the
doctrine of informed consent is unnecessary. The patient has a direct
cause of action for negligence because the surgeon was negligent in fail-
ing to follow operative procedure and inflicting a cut on herself that
infected the patient.70 Assuming that the surgeon's cut was not negli-
gently inflicted, then a cause of action based on lack of informed con-
sent may be available to the patient. The failure to inform the patient
of the surgeon's HIV status created a material risk to the patient
whether or not the surgeon was negligent in inflicting the scalpel
wound. The paramount issue is whether the HIV-infected surgeon
should have disclosed her HIV status so that the patient would have
had the opportunity to refuse the operation by that surgeon.
Hidding v. Williams71 demonstrates the confusion that can result
from inappropriately interjecting informed consent questions into a
case involving competency impairment. Hidding was tried on the in-
formed consent theory based upon (i) the surgeon's failure to advise the
patient of the risk of loss of bladder and bowel control in one out of
200,000 cases, and (ii) his failure to inform the patient that he was "suf-
fering from alcohol abuse." The court affirmed the trial court's holding
and a jury verdict of $307,000. Informed consent provides the classic
theory of recovery for the surgeon's failure to inform the patient of the
potential loss of bladder and bowel control as a result of laminectomy
surgery. Relying upon lack of informed consent to provide recovery for
the surgeon's failure to disclose that he was an alcoholic, however, raises
a more interesting question. 2
70. The fact that the plaintiff's injury resulted from the infectious condition of the surgeon
compared to a noninfectious surgeon (who would inflict no injury) may be considered an extension
of the well-known doctrine that "defendants take their plaintiffs as they find them"-the "egg-
shell skull" doctrine. See, for example, Dulieu v. White and Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669; McCahill v.
New York Transp. Co., 201 N.Y. 211, 94 N.E. 616 (1911) (concerning the death of a man with
delirium tremors induced by a broken leg). See also Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 291-92
(cited in note 13). The extended doctrine would hold that "plaintiffs take their defendants as they
find them," if they are injured as a consequence of a condition that a normal defendant would not
possess.
71. 578 S.2d 1192 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
72. Judge Gothard, writing for the appellate court, was willing to sustain the lower court on
the basis of failure to inform the patient of the defendant surgeon's alcoholism. Id. at 1198. In his
concurring opinion, Judge Grisbaum asserted that an across-the-board application of the informed
consent doctrine would render a "cause-in-fact relationship between failure to disclose and injury.
• . unnecessary." Id. (Grisbaum, J., concurring). According to Grisbaum, the "gut question" is
"whether a professed and practicing alcoholic can operate upon any patient without breaching his
standard of care."Id. Judge Grisbaum, who suggested making this determination on a case-by-case
basis, wrote that the facts and record of Hidding supported a finding of liability based upon the
physician's failure to disclose his alcoholism. Presumably, Judge Grisbaum found evidence of negli-
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Suppose the surgeon had disclosed the one-out-of-200,000 risk of
loss of bladder and bowel control. Would the failure to disclose his alco-
holism alone provide a cognizable ground for a cause of action based on
lack of informed consent? Arguably, had the plaintiff been informed of
the surgeon's alcoholism, he would not have consented to the
laminectomy and, therefore, would not have sustained the loss of blad-
der and bowel control. Even if the patient had been informed of the
surgeon's alcoholism, however, in the absence of any proof that a causal
connection exists between how the operation was performed (that is,
negligently) and the injury sustained (the loss of bladder and bowel
control), the patient should not recover. Whether an alcoholic surgeon
has a higher probability of operating negligently upon a patient and,
indeed, causing the loss of bladder and bowel control while performing
a laminectomy would appear irrelevant, unless in this particular in-
stance the plaintiff can show that the surgeon deviated from the profes-
sional standard of care. However unlikely, a surgeon who is drunk may
be able to perform surgery successfully. If the plaintiff can show no neg-
ligence on the surgeon's part, no liability should ensue."
gence beyond the surgeon's alcoholism; otherwise, he would commit the same fallacy of which he
accused the court, by assuming a causation-in-fact relationship between the surgeon's alcoholism
and the patient's injury. Judge Wicher concurred on the ground of the surgeon's failure to warn of
the loss of bowel and bladder control but expressed no opinion on whether alcohol abuse must be
disclosed under the Louisiana informed consent statute. Id. at 1198-99 (Wicher, J., concurring in
part).
73. Even in the admitted absence of informed consent, the plaintiff must establish a causal
connection between that absence and the injury. For example, in Neat by Neal v. Lu, 365 Pa.
Super. 464, 530 A.2d 103 (1987), the court sustained a jury verdict in favor of a defendant surgeon
who had admittedly failed to obtain informed consent to insert a pin into the plaintiff's finger to
ensure straightness. Id. at 105. The court found that the plaintiff failed to prove causation suffi-
cient to satisfy the informed consent theory, because "although [the surgeon] never discussed the
possibility that he would insert a 'pin' into the finger, none of the evidence establishes, with the
appropriate medical certainty, a causal connection between the insertion of the 'pin' and the inju-
ries for which appellants seek to recover." Id. at 111.
It has been argued that while the type of injury (loss of bowel and bladder control) would be
the same as that which the surgeon discussed with the plaintiff, the probability of this injury
occurring is increased by alcoholism (that is, more than one out of 200,000), thus justifying liability
for a surgeon's failure to inform of alcoholism although the HCP did inform the patient of the
types of risk associated with the procedure. See Jane H. Barney, Comment, A Health Care
Worker's Duty to Undergo Routine Testing for HIVIAIDS and to Disclose Positive Results to
Patients, 52 La. L. Rev. 933, 950-51 (1992). This argument, however, misses the point. The risk of
the procedure, namely, the probability of this type of injury occurring without negligence, is given
as one out of 200,000. If alcoholism increases this risk, the cause must be lack of due care by the
surgeon, which the plaintiff must prove along with a causal connection to the injury.
Compare Hidding with Kaskie v. Wright, 403 Pa. Super. 334, 589 A.2d 213 (1991), in which'
the court addressed a claim of lack of informed consent on the basis of the surgeon's alcoholism
and unlicensed status. The court stated: "[W]e too refuse to expand the informed consent doctrine
to include matters not specifically germane to surgical or operative treatment.... Are patients to
be informed of every fact which might conceivably affect performance in the surgical suite? More-
over, here, no clear nexus has been established between injury and lack of knowledge." Id. at 217.
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Suppose that a surgeon fully discloses all material risks of an oper-
ation to a patient and, in addition, discloses that he has AIDS and that
there is between a one in 416,667 to one in 41,667 risk of transmitting
the virus to the patient.7 4 The patient consents to the operation.7 5 Dur-
ing the course of the operation, the surgeon negligently manipulates a
scalpel, self-inflicting a cut that results in an exchange of blood with the
patient. The operation is otherwise successful; the patient, however,
later tests positive for HIV. Because the patient was fully informed of
the risk of HIV infection, it seems that no cause of action based on lack
of informed consent would exist. This fact should not, however, affect a
cause of action based on the surgeon's negligence in self-inflicting a cut.
The defendant surgeon would be hard pressed to argue that the disclo-
sure of her HIV status should insulate her from all liability, including
liability based on negligence. If such an argument were accepted, ob-
taining informed consent would have the same effect as an exculpatory
clause, releasing the surgeon ex ante from any claims based on her neg-
ligence resulting in the transfer of the virus to the patient. Such excul-
patory clauses are universally held unenforceable. 6
A more difficult question is presented if the transmission of in-
fected blood to the patient was nonnegligent-that is, the transmission
occurred by accident.7 A possible solution would be to consider
whether, according to the professional standard of care, the infected
HCP should have undertaken the procedure at all. Stated another way,
74. See note 16 and accompanying text.
75. Arguably, a patient should not be permitted to consent to an invasive procedure by an
infectious surgeon. Michael L. Closen, When a Doctor Has AIDS, Nat'l L. J. 15 (Sept. 9, 1991).
Patients, however, certainly undertake higher risks, including life-threatening ones, on the basis of
informed consent. Indeed, the risk presented by the infectious surgeon is much lower than the
risks from ordinary negligence by physicians. See Harvard Medical Practice Study, Patients, Doc-
tors, and Lawyers: Medical Injury, Malpractice Litigation, and Patient Compensation in New
York at 3 (1990) (copy on file with the Author) (finding a negligence rate of 1% of hospital dis-
charges) ("Harvard Study").
76. See generally Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 482-84 (cited in note 13). Some state
statutes prohibit such agreements. See, for example, 225 ILCS 60/29 (Smith-Hurd, 1993): "Any
contract or agreement signed by any person prior to, or as a condition of, such person receiving
medical treatment in any form, which releases from liability any physician, hospital or other health
care provider for any malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in the course of administering any
medical treatment or service is void and against the public policy of the State of Illinois." See
notes 240-43 and accompanying text (discussing exculpatory clauses).
77. For example, an HCP may receive a puncture wound as a result of equipment malfunc-
tion or the negligent or accidental conduct of another HCP or a patient. The case of the infectious
HCP is nonetheless distinguishable from that of the competency-impaired HCP. While a surgeon
with advanced Alzheimer's disease generally should not be performing surgery, if she does operate
with due care and no causally related injury occurs, liability should not be imposed upon the sur-
geon for injuries suffered by the patient due to an unforeseeable earthquake that causes the pa-
tient to fall off the operating table. If the surgeon instead has HIV disease and as a consequence of
the earthquake the surgeon's hand is cut, infecting the patient, should liability be imposed?
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was the infected HCP under a duty not to perform such a procedure
because the HCP's condition would create an unreasonable risk of in-
jury even if due care were taken? The respective professions would be
best equipped to identify those procedures that will create such risks.7 8
78. In July of 1991, the CDC published guidelines to prevent the transmission of HIV in the
health care setting. See generally CDC, Recommendations (cited in note 9). Among other recom-
mendations promulgated to prevent the transmission of HIV in exposure-prone procedures, the
CDC stated that "[e]xposure-prone procedures should be identified by medical/surgical/dental or-
ganizations and institutions at which the procedures are performed." Id. at 5. Although these
guidelines were only CDC recommendations, Congress gave them the full force of law by enacting
42 U.S.C. § 300ee-2 (Supp. 1993), amended by Pub. L. No. 102-141, 105 Stat. 876 (1991), which
provides in pertinent part:
[E]ach State Public Health Official, shall, not later than one year after the date of enact-
ment of this Act [Oct. 28, 1991], certify to the Secretary of Health and Human Services that
guidelines issued by the Centers for Disease Control, or guidelines which are equivalent to
those promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control concerning recommendations for
preventing the transmission of HIV and the hepatitis B virus during exposure prone invasive
procedures... have been instituted in the State.
The July 1991 recommendations proposed that doctors who tested HIV-positive should refrain
from exposure-prone procedures, unless they informed patients of their condition and consulted
with outside experts. See Plan Revised for Doctors with AIDS, Chi. Trib. 5 (Dec. 4, 1991) (news
section); Jan Gehorsam, CDC Eases Off on HIV-Infected Health Workers, Atlanta J. & Const.
All (Dec. 5, 1991).
In late 1991, however, the CDC retracted some of its earlier recommendations cited in the July
1991 report. In December 1991, the CDC reportedly "abandoned" its plan to list procedures that
HIV-infected doctors should not perform. Apparently the December 1991 guidelines, which "would
have allowed AIDS-infected medical personnel to continue practicing under certain circumstances
without notifying patients of the AIDS status," were necessary to prevent HIV transmission. In
response to the policy change, the AMA has said that it will develop a list of exposure-prone
procedures. The ADA has said that it will not. See Jerry Schwartz, U.S. Won't Modify Guidelines
on AIDS-Infected Doctors, Reuters (June 19, 1992) (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File). See also AMA Opinion: National Commission on AIDS Healthcare Settings Guidelines,
Newswire (July 31, 1992) (available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File) (stating that the AMA
called for adopting the CDC guidelines for prevention of transmission of HIV and hepatitis viruses
in a health care setting). The change in policy came about as a result of much criticism by the
medical community. See Mary Wagner, HIV Guidelines "Flawed"-Surgeons, Modern Healthcare
11 (Oct. 28, 1991) (discussing the criticism of the American College of Surgeons, the AMA, the
ADA, the American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, the California Medical Association, and the
public health departments of Michigan, New York, and San Francisco). But see Schwartz, Reuters
(June 19, 1992) (reporting that the CDC director, William Roper, decided not to modify the July
and December 1991 recommendations).
Further, OSHA regulations also require affected employers to identify and list jobs that carry
occupational exposure risk:
Exposure Determination... Each employer... shall prepare an exposure determination.
This exposure determination shall contain the following:
(A) A list of all job classifications in which all employees in those job classifications have
occupational exposure;
(B) A list of job classifications in which some employees have occupational exposure; and
(C) A list of all tasks and procedures of groups of closely related tasks and procedures in
which occupational exposure occurs and that are performed by employees in job classifica-
tions ....
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (c)(v)(2)(i)(A-C) (1992).
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D. What Types of Damages Should Be Awarded?
The validity of the "floodgates" argument may lie in the question
of the types of damages awardable in an informed consent case. For
example, if recovery were allowed for mental distress on the basis of a
surgeon's failure to inform a patient of the surgeon's Alzheimer's dis-
ease, the scope of the informed consent doctrine would be expanded
well beyond the "material risks" the doctrine presently recognizes. 9
Consider a more egregious example: a pediatrician who fails to disclose
that he is a pedophile. Should a court award mental distress damages to
the child-patient or parents when there is no molestation but only com-
petent treatment?80
With respect to infectious HCPs who fail to reveal their serostatus,
damages based on a patient's actually contracting the infection would
clearly fall within the material risk posed by the undisclosed condi-
tion."' This risk would also appear to include the patient's fear of con-
tracting the infection. In Johnson v. West Virginia University
Hospitals, Inc.,82 the plaintiff (a non-employee security guard) recov-
ered 1.9 million dollars for his fear of contracting AIDS on the basis of
the defendant hospital's failure to inform him of the HIV status of a
patient the plaintiff was asked to restrain. There was evidence of expo-
sure to HIV in that the patient had some of his own blood in his mouth
when he bit the plaintiff.8 The plaintiff, however, tested negative for
HIV.8 4 In cases in which there is evidence indicating exposure to the
Moreover, it appears highly important that health care facilities carefully evaluate whether
staff privileges should be granted to' or withdrawn from infected HCPs, and carefully delineate
procedures that may be undertaken to restrict or withdraw staff privileges of infectious HCPs.
Compare Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 249 N.J. Super. 597, 592 A.2d 1251, 1254
(1991), in which a hospital immediately withdrew surgical privileges from a surgeon when it
learned he was HIV positive. See notes 41-43, 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing Behringer).
79. Such a broad reading of the scope of the informed consent doctrine would go beyond
Hidding. In Hidding, the patient experienced a loss of bowel and bladder control-a concrete
physical harm as opposed to mental or emotional distress. See notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
80. The plaintiffs likely would allege intentional or negligent infliction of mental distress.
Compare Schurk v. Christensen, 80 Wash. 2d 652, 497 P.2d 937 (1972) (allowing emotional distress
damages to a mother whose child had been molested by a babysitter).
81. See notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
82. 186 W. Va. 648, 413 S.E.2d 889 (1991).
83. Id. at 891 (noting that "[a]t trial, there was evidence that the patient had bitten himself
on the arm, and that the patient's own blood was in and around his mouth when he bit the appel-
lee"). But see Stephanie B. Goldberg, AIDS Phobia-Reasonable Fears or Unreasonable Law-
suits?, A.B.A. J. 88 (June 1992) (ignoring this evidence of the plaintiff's exposure to HIV). The
article's failure to indicate the exposure of the plaintiff to the patient's blood was acknowledged in
response to a letter from Clark B. Frame, one of the plaintiff's attorneys, to the editor of the
A.B.A. Journal. See A.B.A. J. 8-10 (Sept. 1992) (letter to the Editor).
84. In addition to the bite on his arm, other physical manifestations of the plaintiff's distress
included loss of sleep and appetite. Johnson, 413 S.E.2d at 891-92. The plaintiff also introduced
evidence that his wife refused to have sexual relations with him and divorced him because she
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infection, it seems appropriate to award damages for mental distress
associated with the fear of acquiring the infectious disease, although the
exposed person subsequently tests negative to the infection.85 Such
cases appear directly analogous to "cancer-phobia" cases in which per-
sons who have been exposed to carcinogens but do not presently have
feared contracting AIDS. In addition, the plaintiff's children avoided him and kept his grandchil-
dren away from him. Id. at 891.
85. Under the so-called "impact" rule, mental distress damages may be awarded as "para-
sitic" to the plaintiff's physical harm: "With a cause of action established by the physical harm,
'parasitic' damages are awarded and it is considered that there is sufficient assurance that the
mental injury is not feigned." Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 363 (cited in note 13) (footnote
omitted). See also id. at 363-64 nn.43-53 (giving examples of minor impacts supporting parasitic
damages for mental distress). If this fiction need be extended to justify the award of mental dis-
tress damages for exposure to HIV, the foreseeability of testing should provide at least as much
assurance of mental distress as would a minor impact. Even without an impact (for example, under
the "zone of danger" rule), a person suffering physical consequences as a result of emotional dis-
tress (for example, from an exposure to HIV) would fall under the Restatement rule on Physical
Harm Resulting from Emotional Disturbance:
(1) If the actor's conduct is negligent as violating a duty of care designed to protect an-
other from a fright or other emotional disturbance which the actor should recognize as involv-
ing an unreasonable risk of bodily harm, the fact that the harm results solely through the
internal operation of the fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from
liability.
(2) If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing bodily
harm to another otherwise than by subjecting him to fright, shock, or other similar and imme-
diate emotional disturbance, the fact that such harm results solely from the internal opera-
tion of fright or other emotional disturbance does not protect the actor from liability.
(3) The rule stated in Subsection (2) applies where the bodily harm to the other results
from his shock or fright at harm or peril to a member of his immediate family occurring in his
presence.
Restatement § 436 (cited in note 24).
According to the majority rule, however, damages will not be awarded under § 436A for emo-
tional distress alone "without bodily harm or other compensable damage." Nonetheless, at least
seven jurisdictions will grant emotional distress damages without physical consequences. See St.
Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 655 (Tex. 1987). See also JuDay v. Rotunno and
Rotunno, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1571, 276 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1990) (ordered not published) (awarding the
plaintiff $500,000 for emotional distress after her attorneys misappropriated funds). But see Boyles
v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993) (limiting the broad language in Garrard and denying recovery
for mental anguish for surreptitious videotaping of the plaintiff's sexual activity with the defend-
ant). Damages may be exceedingly high in an HIV case. See Jeanne v. Hawkes Hosp. of Mt. Car-
mel, 74 Ohio App. 3d 246, 598 N.E.2d 1174 (1991) (awarding the plaintiff $12 million after she
received a blood transfusion causing her to contract AIDS, while the plaintiff's mother was denied
recovery on her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress). See David Crump, Evaluating
Independent Torts Based upon "Intentional" or "Negligent" Infliction of Mental Distress: How
Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the Bath Water?, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 439, 507 (1992)
(arguing the propriety of the majority rule that negligent infliction claims should be limited to
"cases in which duty can be based upon contractual relationships, independent torts, or properly-
limited bystander claims"). It would seem quite probable that exposure to HIV would satisfy the
"impact" or "zone of danger" rule. See Petriello v. Kalman, 215 Conn. 377, 576 A.2d 474, 481 n.6
(1990) (upholding a jury instruction that stated: "Anxiety over future consequences of an injury is
an element of mental suffering that is compensable.").
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the disease may recover based on their fear of contracting the disease in
the future. 6
In Faya v. Almaraz,s7 the Maryland Court of Appeals went a step
further and authorized a cause of action based upon lack of informed
consent" when a surgeon with AIDS operated-on patients without in-
86. See generally Julie A. Davies, Direct Actions for Emotional Harm: Is Compromise Possi-
ble?, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1992); Frances L. Edwards and Al H. Ringleb, Exposure to Hazardous
Substances and the Mental Distress Tort: Trends, Applications, and a Proposed Reform, 11
Colum. J. Envir. L. 119 (1986); Dale P. Faulkner and Kerin M. Woods, Fear of Future Disabil-
ity-An Element of Damages in a Personal Injury Action, 7 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 865 (1985);
John C. Corrigan and Craig J. Whitney, Asbestos Litigation Under the F.E.L.A., 20 Forum 580
(1985).
Plaintiffs may also claim damages based on the increased risk of contracting the infection in
the future because of subsequent exposure or long conversion time. Nonetheless, if damages are to
be awarded for the increased risk of becoming infected, the plaintiff should provide expert testi-
mony that there is, in fact, an increased risk, such as courts generally have required in toxic sub-
stance cases. See, for example, Sterling v. Velsicol Chemical Corp., 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988)
(holding that the plaintiffs had failed to prove increased susceptibility to a reasonable medical
certainty); Hogerty v. L and L Marine Services, Inc., 788 F.2d 315, 319 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding
that recovery for increased risk is limited to where plaintiff could "show that the toxic exposure
more probably than not will lead to cancer"). The court, however, permitted recovery for fear of
contracting cancer, holding that the plaintiff's right to recover was a jury question. Id. In both
Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1205-07, and Hogerty, 788 F.2d at 317-19, recovery for fear of contracting the
disease was permitted. See also Devlin v. Johns-Manville Corp., 202 N.J. Super. 556, 495 A.2d 495,
499-500 (1985) (holding that a plaintiff could not recover for the increased risk of contracting
asbestosis but could later recover if the increased risk actualized into asbestosis); Schwegel v.
Goldberg, 209 Pa. Super. 280, 228 A.2d 405 (1967) (allowing the plaintiff, a five-year-old boy, to
recover as part of his damages the increased risk of developing epilepsy, despite the small
probability (5%)); Feist v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 267 Or. 402, 517 P.2d 675 (1973) (holding that
it was not error for a jury to hear testimony relating to susceptibility to meningitis although men-
ingitis was not probable but merely a possibility); Petriello, 576 A.2d at 474 (allowing testimony
concerning the 8 to 16% chance of developing a future bowel obstruction); DeMaio v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 1990 LEXIS 2122 at *1 (unpublished) (allowing the jury to decide the question whether
the plaintiff's increased risk of contracting asbestosis was a present compensable injury).
Only a minority of courts permit recovery for merely an increased risk of contracting the dis-
ease in the future, as opposed to a probability of contracting it. Some courts have permitted a
separate cause of action, however, if the disease later develops, even after the statute of limitations
has run from the date of the original exposure. See John Patrick Darby, Tort Liability for the
Transmission of the AIDS Virus: Damages for Fear of AIDS and Prospective AIDS, 45 Wash. &
Lee. L. Rev. 185, 205 n.110 (1988) (listing cases). See generally Fournier J. Gale and James L.
Goyer, Recovery for Cancerphobia and Increased Risk of Cancer, 15 Cumb. L. Rev. 723, 738-39
(1985); Kevin A. LaValle, Groundwater Contamination: Removal of the Constraints Barring Re-
covery for Increased Risk and Fear of Future Diseases, 1988 Detroit C. L. Rev. 65.
87. 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327 (1993).
88. Dr. Almaraz was an oncological surgeon who specialized in breast cancer; both plaintiffs
had undergone breast surgery. In addition to negligent failure to obtain informed consent, plain-
tiffs Faya and Rossi alleged negligence, fraud, and intentional infliction of mental distress. Faya
added counts based on negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract. Rossi also alleged loss
of consortium, breach of fiduciary duty, and battery. Id. at 330. The court distilled the common
issue to be the surgeon's failure to disclose his infected condition: "The gist of the complaints was
that Almaraz acted wrongfully in operating on the two women without first telling them he was
HIV-positive (and, later ill from AIDS) .... " Id.
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forming them, although the patients could not prove actual exposure to
the virus and had tested negative for HIV.s9 The court approved the
awarding of damages based on the patients' reasonable "fear and
mental distress" of contracting AIDS if accompanied by a "physical in-
jury," which the court defined as an injury that can be measured objec-
tively." In Faya, the court considered allegations of "headache,
sleeplessness, and the physical and financial sting of blood tests for the
AIDS virus" in addition to fear and mental distress adequate to sup-
port an award of damages.91 The court, however, limited the patients'
recovery "for their fear and its physical manifestations... for the period
constituting their reasonable window of anxiety-the period between
which they learned of [the surgeon's] illness and received their HIV-
negative results. '9 2 The court based this time limitation on the current
state of knowledge that there is a ninety-five percent certainty that a
person will test positive for HIV within six months of exposure to the
virus."
89. The court based the surgeon's duty to disclose his infected condition on the foreseeability
of the transmission of the virus during an invasive procedure, citing the AMA's Policy and Code.
Id. at 333-34. The court refused to require that the plaintiffs allege actual transmissions as this
"would unfairly punish them for lacking the requisite information to do so." Id. at 337.
90. Id. at 338-39 (citing Vance v. Vance, 286 Md. 490, 408 A.2d 728 (1979)).
91. Faya, 620 A.2d at 338.
92. Id. at 337 (footnote omitted). The court added in the footnote: "We note that the window
of anxiety closes once satisfactory information becomes available that puts to rest the fear of in-
jury. Hence, even had the appellants not undergone immediate blood testing, their recovery span
would be limited to the same duration, for the fear-relieving information, if known to them, would
have been available for their retrieval." Id. at 337 n.10.
93. Id. at 337. It is not apparent why, except as a bright line limitation on liability, a reason-
able person could not have fear of contracting AIDS when in 5% (one out of 20) of the cases
seroconversion can occur beyond the six-month time limit. Indeed, it has been reported that
"[n]ewer molecular biology techniques (polymerase chain reaction) show a small incidence of indi-
viduals (< 1%) who are infected with HIV for up to 36 months without generating an antibody
response." Harry Hollander and Mitchell H. Katz, HIV-Related Conditions, in Steven A. Schroe-
der, et al., eds., Current Medical Diagnosis & Treatment 939, 941 (Lange, 1991). See also Carroll
v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, Inc., 1992 WL 276717 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct 12, 1992), in
which the court allowed recovery for mental distress to a plaintiff who received a puncture wound
after sticking her fingers into an exposed hypodermic needle container. The plaintiff tested nega-
tive for over three years. Id. at *6 (Highers, J., dissenting). The court held that the plaintiff need
not prove actual exposure to HIV because the medical profession presumes contamination of dis-
carded needles. Id. at *5. The case was remanded to determine if the plaintiff's fear was reasona-
ble, with the court cautioning that the period of recovery for mental distress extended "until other
factors make the fear unreasonable." Id. See also Kerins v. Hartley, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 786, which
follows Faya on substantially the same facts, summarizes the AIDS-phobia cases, and concludes:
[A]ppellant's unabated emotional distress became unreasonable, ergo, not compensable, once
the following events occurred: she received access to the operative report and/or in some other
manner received assurances that no actual exposure to [the AIDS infected surgeon's] blood
had occurred; she received test results negative for the presence of HIV antibodies; and she
had the opportunity to obtain counseling on the accuracy and reliability of the testing meth-
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E. A Pitfall of Disclosure: Loss of Professional Livelihood
A final argument against imposing a duty on HCPs to disclose their
infectious status to patients is that HCPs will then be unable to con-
tinue to practice their professions. 4 Once patients are informed that an
HCP is infected, word will get around; HCPs have little, if any, means
to prevent patients from revealing their condition. Patients generally do
not owe a duty of confidentiality to their HCPs.9 Furthermore, upon
disclosure, patients will not only refuse invasive procedures but likely
will also terminate the relationship with the HCP.9 6 Thus, HCPs have a
strong disincentive to disclose their infected status, when such disclo-
sure in all likelihood means loss of professional livelihood.
While disclosing their infected condition may have severe economic
and emotional consequences for HCPs, it is not apparent, at least from
the viewpoint of tort law, why the risk of exposure should be imposed
upon unwary patients. After all, the fiduciary nature of the HCP-pa-
tient relationship and the principle of patient autonomy impose the
duty to disclose material risks.9 The placement of HCPs in moral jeop-
ardy does not mean that the jeopardy should be visited on patients as
ods employed and the very remote probability of seroconversion more than 18 months after
surgery.
Id. at *35.
94. See, for example, Eisenstat, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. at 316-17 (cited in note 49), who but-
tresses this argument with the contention that fear of loss of livelihood would diminish the number
of HCPs willing to treat AIDS patients.
95. One could argue that such a duty of confidence may arise if the HCP conditions the
acceptance or continued treatment of a patient on the patient's agreeing to maintain the confi-
dence of the HCP. Upon the HCP's disclosure of her infected status, the patient would, of course,
be free not to enter into or to terminate the relationship. The tort theory of the "right of privacy"
denominated by Dean Prosser as "public disclosure of private facts" may also limit a patient's
freedom to disclose the HCP's infectious status. See Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 856-59
(cited in note 13). Prosser identifies three elements of this tort: "(1) the disclosure of the private
facts must be a public disclosure and not a private one; (2) the facts disclosed to the public must
be private facts, and not public ones; and (3) the matter made public must be one which would be
highly offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities." Id. at 856-57.
Restatement § 652D, cmt. d (cited in note 24) adds a requirement that the matter disclosed not be
one of "legitimate concern to the public" (citing Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975)). Thus, even if a patient discloses the fact that an HCP is HIV-positive to the public (rather
than just to family and friends), a serious question may be raised whether the public has an inter-
est in the matter.
Disclosure of HIV status by a private individual should be contrasted with disclosure by a
government official or agency, which may involve a violation of the constitutional right of privacy.
See Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 136-43 & 136 n.369 (1991) (discussing the
constitutional implications of disclosing "intimate information" including HIV status and collect-
ing cases).
96. See notes 6 and 31 (listing surveys on public attitudes toward HIV-positive HCPs).
97. See notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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well." The conflict between the best interests of patients and those of
HCPs is nicely summarized in Matter of Quinlan, although in a context
far less threatening to the personal well-being of HCPs: "Nevertheless,
there must be a way to free physicians, in the pursuit of their healing
vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or self-protection
concerns which would inhibit their independent medical judgments for
the well-being of their ... patients." 9 Perhaps the problem of moral
jeopardy has been overemphasized. If patients are fully informed of the
very low risks of transfer associated with infectious diseases (such as
HIV) and these risks are placed in their proper perspective by compari-
son to the magnitude of other risks, reasonable patients may decide to
continue in the relationship, particularly if a strong relationship of trust
and confidence has already been established between patient and
HCP.100
If the foregoing analysis is sound, the doctrine of informed consent
imposes a duty on HCPs to advise patients of their infected status
when that status constitutes a material risk of treatment. In several re-
spects, the application of the informed consent doctrine here has more
cogency than in its traditional context, which is concerned with mate-
rial risks of the proposed treatment itself. First, patients who refuse
treatment after being fully informed of the risks of treatment may
forego the benefits of the procedure, while patients who refuse to be
treated by an infected HCP have the alternative of seeking treatment
from an uninfected HCP. Second, whil6 the principle of autonomy ap-
plies equally in both contexts, the ethical principle of nonmaleficence' 0 1
98. The argument has been made that the "better good" would be served by imposing a
duty on HCPs not to disclose to patients, to ensure that HCPs will treat infected patients. See
Eisenstat, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. at 322 (cited in note 49). This argument seems to undermine both
the fiduciary obligation of the HCP to his patients and patient autonomy.
99. Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 49, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (1976) (holding that the right of
privacy authorizes the discontinuance of a life support system for a comatose patient, who had
been on a respirator for nine years).
100. This statement may be true in the relatively large number of cases in which patients
perceive their particular HCPs as having unique skills and special familiarity with their particular
conditions. This is not to suggest, however, that HCPs should be authorized to proceed on the
basis of informed consent with respect to any procedure regardless of how invasive or dangerous,
even in the absence of negligence on the part of the HCP.
HCPs may be able to protect themselves from a total loss of income by insurance. A number
of insurance carriers offer or are considering offering as part of their coverage a lump sum payment
(ranging from $100,000 to $500,000 based on their premiums) to HIV-infected HCPs to induce
them to restrict their practices to noninvasive procedures or to withdraw from practice. See Dean
Major, Insurers Pay Docs with HIV to Quit, Health Week 1, 32 (Nov. 18, 1991).
101. See Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics 120
(Oxford U., 3d ed. 1989) (notes omitted):
The concept of nonmaleficence or not inflicting harm has been associated with the maxim
Primum non nocere, "Above all [or first] do no harm." This maxim has wide currency in
discussions of the responsibilities of health-care professionals; yet its origins are obscure.
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provides another basis for the imposition of a duty of disclosure upon
infected HCPs. Uninfected HCPs who fail to inform patients of mate-
rial risks of treatment may do so in good faith, albeit negligently. In-
fected HCPs who fail to inform patients of their status unfortunately
find themselves in an ethical dilemma in which self-interest may con-
flict with patient well-being.
III. REVERSE INFORMED CONSENT: HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL VERSUS
PATIENT
A number of tort theories can be advanced on behalf of HCPs at-
tempting to recover against patients who fail to inform HCPs of their
HIV-infected status. These theories include battery, in which the HCP
would assert that the patient's failure to inform of his infectious status
vitiated the HCP's consent to treat the patient; thus, the patient inten-
tionally inflicted a harmful or offensive contact on the HCP. 10 2 It may
be assumed, as is the case when patients use the battery theory against
HCPs, that consent on the part of the HCP to treat the patient would
be implied and that a theory other than battery would be adopted if a
duty to disclose were imposed on patients.10 An HCP may allege fraud-
ulent misrepresentation if a patient intentionally fails to inform the
HCP of the patient's infectious status"" or negligent misrepresentation
Often proclaimed the fundamental principle in the Hippocratic tradition in medical ethics, it
is not found in the Hippocratic corpus, and a venerable statement often confused with
it-"At least, do no harm"-is not the most accurate translation of a passage that does ap-
pear in Hippocrates. Nonetheless, the Hippocratic oath does express a duty of nonmaleficence
together with a duty of beneficence: "I will use treatment to help the sick according to my
ability and judgment, but will never use it to injure or wrong them."
102. The classic example of this theory is De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881), in
which a physician failed to inform the plaintiff that the person accompanying him and assisting in
the delivery of her baby was not medically trained.
103. The applicable theory began to shift from battery to informed consent on a negligence
basis in the 1960s. See Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 190 (cited in note 13). See also Allan H.
McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 381,
434 (1957).
104. See Restatement § 310 (cited in note 24) (Conscious Misrepresentation Involving Risk
of Physical Harm), which states:
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical
harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the truth
of the representation, if the actor
(a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to induce action by
the other, or a third person, which involves an unreasonable risk of physical harm to the
other, and
(b) knows
(i) that the statement is false, or
(ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes.
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if the patient negligently fails to so inform.105 Both of these theories
implicitly would require that the patient be under a duty to make such
a disclosure. A plaintiff may also rely upon the theories of intentional0 6
or negligent infliction of mental distress'07 if the HCP suffered mental
distress as a consequence of contact with the patient but is not in fact
infected. Whether the patient's failure was intentional or negligent, the
requirement that the patient has a duty to inform is implicit.
The common element, whether the HCP's theory is battery, mis-
representation, or infliction of mental distress, is the imposition of a
duty on the infected patient to inform the HCP of the patient's in-
fected status. 08 Imposing such a duty on patients stands in sharp con-
trast to the duty imposed on HCPs to inform patients based upon the
HCP-patient relationship. A duty running from the patient to the HCP
would be analogous to the doctrine of informed consent as applied to
the HCP's duty to the patient. The following analysis will be based
upon a theory of "reverse informed consent," which creates a duty run-
ning from patient to HCP. A careful analysis of the duty issue must be
105. See Restatement § 311 (cited in note 24) (Negligent Misrepresentation Involving Risk
of Physical Harm), which states:
(1) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm caused by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information,
where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
106. See Restatement § 46 (cited in note 24) (Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emo-
tional Distress), which states:
(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe
emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily
harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.
(2) Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress
(a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is present at the time,
whether or not such distress results in bodily harm, or
(b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily
harm.
Even presuming that the HCP suffers "extreme emotional distress," the critical issue would be
whether the patient's failure to inform was "extreme and outrageous conduct," a finding likely to
be difficult to sustain if the patient is justifiably concerned about the loss of confidentiality and
attendant consequences.
107. See text accompanying notes 79-93 and particularly note 85 (discussing recovery of
mental distress damages on the basis of negligent conduct).
108. This was the approach of the court in Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 620 A.2d 327
(1993), in which various theories of recovery, including those discussed above as well as breach of
contract and fiduciary duty, were alleged, but the court considered lack of informed consent to be
the gist of the cause of action. See also note 88.
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undertaken, for if such a duty cannot be established, the HCP's case
fails regardless of what theory is adopted.
A. The Case For and Against a Duty to Disclose
The assertion that patients are under neither an ethical nor a legal
duty to inform their HCPs of material risks associated with their treat-
ment is obviously too broad. 0 9 In terms of ethical theory, the principles
of nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice 10 are not limited to particular
categories of people such as professionals, but extend to all human be-
ings."' For example, patients who intentionally fail to disclose their in-
fectious status to reasonably unsuspecting HCPs who are about to
undertake treatment that might expose the HCP to infection clearly
109. For example, Gordon Keyes asserts: "The patient [compared to the HCP] has no corre-
sponding ethical duty to the doctor." Keyes, 16 J.C. & U. L. at 605 (cited in note 49). This asser-
tion fails to recognize the fact that a large number of people would acknowledge some duty
running from patient to HCP. Indeed, in a Newsweek poll, 97% of those polled responded "yes" to
the question: "Should patients be required to tell physicians, dentists and other health-care work-
ers if they are infected with the AIDS virus?" Kantrowitz, Newsweek at 56 (cited in note 6).
110. For a discussion of nonmaleficence, see note 101. With respect to autonomy, Beauchamp
and Childress summarize the views of Immanuel Kant and John Stuart Mill:
In various writings, Kant argued that respect for autonomy flows from the recognition
that all persons have unconditional worth, each having the capacity to determine his or her
own destiny. To violate a person's autonomy is to treat that person merely as a means, to
treat that person in accordance with one's own goals and without regard to that person's
goals. To reject that person's goals and considered judgments or to restrict his or her freedom
to act on those goals and judgments is to fail to respect autonomy.
Mill was more concerned about the autonomy-or, as he preferred to say, the individual-
ity-of action and thought. He argued that social control over individual actions is legitimate
only if it is necessary to prevent harm to other individuals and that citizens should be permit-
ted to develop their potential according to their personal convictions, as long as they do not
interfere with a like expression of freedom by others. Mill held that a person with true char-
acter is one of genuine individuality, whereas a person "without character" is under an op-
pressive, controlling influence by church, state, parents, or family.
Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics at 71-72 (cited in note 101) (notes
omitted). Beauchamp and Childress discuss justice in terms of fairness, desert, and entitlement:
Some moral philosophers, notably John Rawls, have argued that justice is best explicated
in terms of fairness. Clearly there are close conceptual connections between these terms, but
the concept of justice is also closely linked to desert: One acts justly toward a person when
that person has been given what the person deserves.. . . Additionally. . . justice confers an
entitlement whether deserved by the person or not. Justice is "giving to each his due," as it
was put in some ancient accounts. One who has a claim based in justice has a claim of entitle-
ment and in this strong sense is due something. An injustice, in turn, involves a wrong where
one has been denied that to which one is entitled.
Id.- at 257 (footnotes omitted).
111. As Rawls stated, "[ethical] principles are to be universal in application. They must hold
for everyone in virtue of their being moral persons." John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 132
(Harvard U., 1971). "What is right for one person must be right for all persons in relevantly similar
circumstances." Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics at 18 (cited in note
101). With respect to a duty to disclose a potentially lethal infection, it is not apparent that HCPs
and patients are dissimilarly situated.
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violate the ethical principle of nonmaleficence. Under such circum-
stances an HCP deserves to be treated as any other human being-not
to be subjected to material risks.
112
The guiding principle of the doctrine of informed consent is auton-
omy: individuals should have the opportunity to make decisions poten-
tially affecting their personal well-being in an informed manner.113 The
failure of patients to disclose an infectious condition deprives HCPs of
their autonomy to decide to refuse to treat the patient, to refer him to
another HCP, or to treat him in an alternative or safer manner.
Finally, justice is not served if HCPs are placed in the unequal po-
sition of being subjected to material risks that could be avoided or at
least mitigated.1 4 This proposition is especially true because HCPs
have an ethical and legal duty to keep patient disclosures
confidential.
11 5
On the other hand, imposing a legal duty on patients to disclose
material risks associated with their care presents a more difficult ques-
tion: whether patients' failure to inform HCPs creates an unreasonable
risk of injury to the HCP. Although no direct authority exists in sup-
port of imposing a duty on patients to inform HCPs of such material
risks, one can anticipate how courts would deal with this issue. As Jus-
tice Cardozo stated:
112. A distinction exists between a patient negligently failing to disclose and a patient inten-
tionally withholding information about a material risk. Thus, a situation in which a patient did not
subjectively know of the material risk of nondisclosure is ethically distinguishable from a situation
in which a reasonable patient should have known of the risk.
113. See, for example, In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987), which details the basis for the
principle of autonomy or self-determination applied in informed consent cases. The court first
quotes John Stuart Mill: "Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign."
Id. at 950 (citation omitted). It then quotes Justice Gray of the United States Supreme Court: "No
right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of
others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the
court quotes Judge Cardozo: "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation with-
out his patient's consent, commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." Id. (quoting
Schloendorff v. Soc'y of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
114. See Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics at 259 (cited in note
101): "The only principle common to all theories of justice is a minimal principle traditionally
attributed to Aristotle: Equals must be treated equally, and unequals must be treated unequally."
115. See, for example, American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, adopted
July 22, 1980, Principle IV in Rena H. Gorlin, ed., Codes of Professional Responsibility 191 (BNA,
2d ed. 1990): "A physician shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of the law." See gen-
erally Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the Physician in the Pro-
tection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. Rev. 255 (1984); Almeta E. Cooper, The Physician's
Dilemma: Protection of the Patient's Right to Privacy, 22 S.L.U. L. J. 397 (1978).
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We go forward with our logic, with our analogies, with our philosophies, till we
reach a certain point. At first, we have no trouble with the paths; they follow the
same lines. Then they begin to diverge, and we must make a choice between them.
History or custom or social utility or some compelling sentiment of justice or some-
times perhaps a semi-intuitive apprehension of the pervading spirit of our law must
come to the rescue of the anxious judge, and tell him where to go.'1 6
Boulais v. Lustig, a California case, directly addresses the issue of a
patient's duty to disclose an unreasonable risk of injury. 117 In Boulais, a
surgeon inadvertently cut the plaintiff, a surgical technician, on the fin-
ger while the technician was removing sutures from the defendant pa-
tient after cosmetic surgery, thereby exposing the plaintiff to the
defendant's blood. 18 The plaintiff tested negative for HIV.l ' e Allegedly,
the defendant did not inform the surgeon or the plaintiff that she had
AIDS and, in addition, falsely indicated on medical forms that she was
not presently being treated or observed for any medical condition.'2 0
The jury returned a $102,500 verdict for fraud and negligent infliction
of mental distress, including $2,500 in punitive damages.' 2' The trial
judge granted the defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict on the negligence count but let stand the jury verdict on the
basis of fraud. The case was settled.' 22 A critical issue in such a case
should be whether the defendant patient had a duty to inform the sur-
geon and the plaintiff (presumably as a foreseeable surgical technician)
that she had AIDS prior to undergoing the procedure.
123
A closely analogous case is Ordway v. County of Suffolk,' 4 in
which a surgeon brought an action against the county for the failure of
the police to advise him that a burglary suspect brought into the hospi-
116. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 43 (Yale U., 1921).
117. Boulais v. Lustig, No. BC38105 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1993). See note 15.
118. See Penelope McMillan, Jury Rules Against AIDS Patient, L.A. Times Bi (Feb. 10,
1993).
119. Id.
120. See Health Worker Sues Patient over HIV, Chi. Trib. 8 (Sept. 24, 1991) (news section).
121. With respect to the negligent infliction of mental distress claim, the jury apportioned
60% of the fault to the defendant, 39% to the surgeon and the clinic, and 1% to the plaintiff. One
juror indicated that the small amount awarded for punitive damages was based on "consideration
of the defendant's status." McMillan, L.A. Times at BI (cited in note 118).
122. See 2 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1337 (1993) (stating that the case settled for $15,000).
123. In granting the JNOV on the negligence issue, the judge stated that there is "no duty of
a patient to be truthful concerning his/her medical condition with his/her medical care providers
[that] has been established by the facts of this case or by court decision or law." Id. See text
accompanying notes 141-189 (analyzing this issue). The fraud issue would be more straightforward
if the defendant intentionally misrepresented her physical condition and the plaintiff relied on
that misrepresentation. See note 104. It is interesting to note that the defendant was not asked if
she was HIV-positive (which she admitted when asked) until the surgeon inflicted the cut. Neither
the surgeon nor the plaintiff technician wore gloves during the procedure. See Pristin, L.A. Times
at B3 (cited in note 15). The causation issue raised by the HCP's failure to wear gloves is consid-
ered by the text accompanying notes 194-213.
124. 583 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992).
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tal for emergency treatment was HIV positive. The county joined the
hospital as a third party defendant. The surgeon alleged that he would
have used additional precautions had he been informed of the suspect's
HIV status and now suffered from "HIV phobia" after having operated
twice on the suspect without knowledge that the patient was HIV posi-
tive.125 The trial court categorized the plaintiff's cause of action as
"founded on the theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress"'26
and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding:
"Absent any allegation of an unusual occurrence during the operations
themselves [there was no allegation of a cut glove or pierced skin] or
indicia of legitimacy in plaintiff's postoperative condition [the surgeon
tested negative for HIV before trial and alleged no loss of income], the
claim asserted herein is insufficient as a matter of law and defendants
are entitled to judgment in their favor....
Assuming arguendo that the plaintiff could allege cognizable dam-
ages, the court further concluded that the county police were under no
duty to inform the surgeon of the suspect's HIV status.' 28 Although the
court's conclusion is dictum, its reasoning raises a number of concerns.
First, the court reads the New York Public Health Law Act'29 as estab-
lishing a strong public policy in favor of protecting the confidentiality
of HIV-infected persons, 30 and refers to the regulations promulgated
under the Act as specifically prohibiting the "disclosure of HIV related
information solely to carry out 'infection control precautions.' ""s The
court then justifies the nondisclosure by the police on the basis that the
125. The Ordway court noted, "Plaintiff claims that had he known of the patient's condition
he would have taken 'certain necessary precautions' including the use of 'a full face shield or gog-
gles, a specific type of respirator or breathing protector, double gloves, changing gown every 30
minutes and knee-high boots'." Id. at 1015.
126. Id. The plaintiff did not specifically identify his theory of recovery.
127. Id. at 1017.
128. Id.
129. N.Y. Pub. Health Law §§ 2780-2787 (McKinney, 1988).
130. Ordway, 563 N.Y.S.2d at 1017. The court cites N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10,
§ 63.5(b)(J) [sic-presumably the citation is to § 63.5(j)], which states:
Confidential HIV-related information shall not be disclosed to a health care provider or
health care facility for the sole purpose of implementing infection control precautions when
such provider or facility is regulated under the Public Health Law and required to implement
such precautions with all individuals pursuant to this Title. This restriction shall not limit
access to HIV-related information by a facility's infection control personnel for purposes of
fulfilling their designated responsibilities in the facility.
N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 63.5(j) (1992) (emphasis added). It may be noted that no
provision in the Act itself corresponds to the foregoing prohibition.
131. Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
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surgeon made no allegation that he would have altered the treatment if
the patient had disclosed his HIV status." 2
The court further recognizes that there is "something of a paradox"
in the Public Health Law Act. 33 Police officers are obligated to main-
tain the patient's HIV status in confidence, unless, according to the Act,
disclosure would "affect [the patient's] treatment."'14 Thus, the para-
dox: "[H]ow can the Police Officers know the answer to this legislative
requirement unless they initially reveal the patient's status to the treat-
ing physician?" 13 5 Nevertheless, the court concludes that under the cir-
cumstances of Ordway, the police had no duty to disclose the suspect's
HIV status to the surgeon.136 If the physician had alleged that he would
have undertaken an alternative course of treatment if informed of the
patient's HIV status, by implication, at least, the police would have had
a duty to disclose. Of course, this interpretation places the police in the
untenable position of being required to make a medical judgment.13 7 In
the final analysis, a statutory construction that overlooks an important
provision of the Act is unsound.3 8 Perhaps a better interpretation
would consider nondisclosure to be the general rule, with an exception
permitting disclosure of a patient's HIV status to an HCP when treat-
ment is involved. 3 9
The Ordway court does not address the question of whether a pa-
tient personally would be under a duty to disclose his HIV status to a
surgeon, because the surgeon never brought the patient in as a party. In
any event, whatever disclosure the police-surgeon relationship requires,
the relationship between the patient and the surgeon certainly is closer;
132. Id. This holding raises a causation issue, which will be addressed below. See text accom-
panying notes 196-213.
133. Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
134. Id. N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 2782(1)(d) provides an exception for disclosure to "a health
care provider or health facility when knowledge of the HIV related information is necessary to
provide appropriate care or treatment to the protected individual or a child of the individual ..
135. Ordway, 583 N.Y.S.2d at 1017-18.
136. Id. at 1018. The court suggests that the conflicting subdivisions of the New York Public
Health Law Act will eventually be reconciled. Id.
137. Presumably proof of the availability of alternative treatments would require expert tes-
timony. Indeed, whether or not the use of additional precautions should be considered part of the
patient's treatment raises a difficult question.
138. See, for example, Norman J. Singer, 2A Statutes and Statutory Construction § 46.06 at
119-20 (Clark, 5th ed. 1992) (stating that "[a] statute should be construed so that effect is given to
all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant..
(footnotes omitted).
139. Whatever the applicability of the regulation prohibiting the disclosure of HIV informa-
tion to HCPs "for the sole purpose of implementing infection control precautions," when medical
treatment is involved-in particular, when an operation is planned-a facile interpretation would
claim that disclosure in such a case would not be solely for infection control but would, at least in
part, involve medical judgment insofar as knowledge of the patient's HIV condition would be rele-
vant to the treatment prescribed. N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 63.5(j).
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thus the foundation for imposing upon the patient a duty to disclose is
stronger.140
B. The Foundations of a Duty to Disclose
1. Duty Based on Analogy
A number of analogies may aid in defining the relationship between
patients and their HCPs. Certainly, HCPs and patients would not be
considered strangers, as defined by tort law. The common law is hesi-
tant to impose an affirmative duty on an actor who has no preexisting
relationship with another to warn the latter of a known risk not created
by the actor. The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 314 states this
rule as follows: "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that
action on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not
of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." '141 As an illustra-
tion, the rule provides that a stranger is under no duty to warn a blind
person stepping off a curb of an approaching automobile, and the fail-
ure to warn by word or touch would not impose liability on the
stranger." 2
At the other end of the spectrum, it would be difficult to define the
relationship of patients to their HCPs as identical to that of HCPs to
their patients-that is, of a fiduciary nature implying utmost trust and
confidence. Indeed, the imposition of the fiduciary relationship results
from the professional knowledge of the HCP and the dependent posi-
tion of the patient.
143
An appropriate analogy may be based upon the relationship of per-
sons intimate enough to enter into sexual relationships. A considerable
body of case law imposes a duty on one sexual partner to disclose to the
other that he or she has a sexually transmitted disease (STD).4 The
140. Another question not answered by the Ordway court is whether the hospital owed a
duty to the surgeon to inform him of the patient's HIV status. The hospital was made a third-
party defendant by the county. The reported opinion does not indicate whether the police had
disclosed the patient's HIV status to the hospital or whether the patient himself had disclosed this
fact to the hospital.
141. Restatement § 314 (cited in note 24).
142. Id. cmt. c, illus. 1.
143. See note 26 (discussing the fiduciary relationship).
144. See, for example, Berner v. Caldwell, 543 S.2d 686 (Ala. 1989) (allowing a cause of ac-
tion for negligent transmission of genital herpes because of a state public policy of preventing the
spread of sexually communicable diseases); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (allowing a cause of action based on either the defendant's negligent or deliberate
failure to inform the plaintiff that he was infected with a venereal disease); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428
N.W.2d 103 (Minn. App. 1988) (allowing a cause of action by a husband against his wife for negli-
gent and fraudulent transmission of herpes); B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988)
(allowing a nurse to state a cause of action based on fraud and negligence by alleging that a physi-
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cases are not limited to instances in which one partner makes fraudu-
lent misrepresentations denying the presence of an STD.4 5 Rather, case
law reveals that an affirmative duty to disclose may be imposed inde-
pendent of overt misrepresentation. Moreover, the cases are not limited
to married or engaged couples. For example, the court in B.N. v. K.K.
held that the defendant need not have a confidential relationship with
the plaintiff before being required to inform her that he had genital
herpes; rather, the defendant was under a general duty to disclose.14 6 It
cian, who knew he had genital herpes, had intercourse with her without disclosing this informa-
tion); Maharam v. Maharam, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1986) (holding that a wife could
maintain a cause of action against her husband for transmission of genital herpes on theories of
either fraud or negligence); S.A.V. v. K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (holding that interspousal
immunity would not bar a wife's claim against her husband for the transmission of herpes).
Compare Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 252 N.J. Super. 230, 599 A.2d 604 (Ch. Div. 1991) (holding
that while one spouse may sue another for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a hus-
band failed to state a cause of action when allegations were limited to his wife committing adultery
and no transmission of an STD occurred); Doe v. Doe, 519 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987)
(holding a wife's cause of action for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress insuffi-
cient when her husband had a homosexual affair that allegedly placed his wife at risk of getting
AIDS).
See generally Robert A. Prentice and Paula C. Murray, Liability for Transmission of Herpes:
Using Traditional Tort Principles to Encourage Honesty in Sexual Relationships, 11 J. Contemp.
L. 67 (1984); Deane Kenworthy Corliss, Comment, AIDS-Liability for Negligent Sexual Trans-
mission, 18 Cumb. L. Rev. 691 (1988); Bonnie E. Elber, Note, Negligence as a Cause of Action for
Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 19 U. Toledo L. Rev. 923 (1988); Daniel M. Oyler, Interspousal
Tort Liability for Infliction of a Sexually Transmitted Disease, 29 J. Family L. 519 (1990-91);
David P. Brigham, Comment, You Never Told Me ... You Never Asked: Tort Liability for the
Sexual Transmission of AIDS, 91 Dickinson L. Rev. 529 (1986) (discussing other STD cases);
Marcia Baran, Case Note, Tort Liability for the Transmission of Genital Herpes: A New Legal
Duty? R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 12 Hamline L. Rev. 91 (1988); Louis A. Alexander, Note, Liability in Tort
for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the Law, 70 Cornell L. Rev. 101
(1984); Kimm Alayne Walton, Note, Kathleen K. v. Robert B.: A Cause of Action for Genital
Herpes Transmission, 34 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 498 (1984).
145. In Berner v. Caldwell, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant either negligently or
intentionally failed to disclose to her that he had genital herpes. The plaintiff made no allegation
concerning overt misrepresentation, but based her cause of action on a negligence theory. 543 S.2d
at 687, 689. In Maharam v. Maharam, the court concluded that the plaintiff stated cognizable
causes of action for the wrongful transmission of genital herpes based either on theories of fraud or
negligence. 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107. Although the plaintiff's fraud count did not allege an overt mis-
representation, the court held that "the thirty-one year marital relationship gave rise to an affirm-
ative 'legal duty to speak,' and the allegation that the husband failed to disclose his condition
adequately states a cause of action for constructive, if not actual, fraud." Id. In finding this duty,
the court relied in part on a New York Public Health Law that made it a misdemeanor for a
person infected with a venereal disease to have sexual intercourse with another individual. Id. See
also B.N. v. K.K., in which the court found that the complaint stated a cause of action despite the
absence of an overt misrepresentation: "Of course, concealment cannot be the basis of an action in
deceit if there is no duty to speak. But if there is such a duty, the concealment can result in
liability to the same extent that an actual denial of the existence of the fact would." B.N., 538 A.2d
at 1183.
146. B.N. v. K.K. did not involve a confidential relationship-such as that between husband
and wife-but rather involved a romantic relationship between a nurse and a physician. B.N., 538
A.2d at 1177.
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was sufficient that the defendant should have known that the relation-
ship was highly likely to cause harm to the plaintiff.141 If courts impose
a duty to disclose non-life-threatening STDs before engaging in sex, it
would be no great stretch to impose a duty on patients to disclose a
potentially deadly risk to treating HCPs.'48
2. Duty Based on Risk-Utility Analysis
Another approach to the duty issue would involve using the utility
of noninforming to contrast the risk created by HCPs' failure to inform
patients and the converse risk created by patients' failure to inform
their HCPs. The risk-utility approach found in the Restatement 14 9
would be central to such an analysis.150 Restatement Section 291 adopts
a risk-utility analysis to determine whether a risk is unreasonable; an
act is negligent when the magnitude of risk of harm exceeds the utility
of that particular course of conduct.151
a. The Utility of Nondisclosure
The quantum of utility is measured by a number of factors set out
in Section 292.152 The first factor noted is "the social value which the
147. In addressing the negligence count, B.N. relied on traditional tort principles, rather than
the presence of a confidential relationship to find a duty to disclose:
One who knows he or she has a highly infectious disease can readily foresee the danger
that the disease may be communicated to others with whom the infected person comes into
contact. As a consequence, the infected person has a duty to take reasonable precau-
tions-whether by warning others or by avoiding contact with them-to avoid transmitting
the disease.
" As a consequence [of Dr. K. knowing he had active genital herpes], Dr. K. had a duty
either to refrain from sexual contact with Ms. N. or to warn her of his condition. If, as she
charges, he negligently failed to do either, he breached his duty.
Id. at 1179. See also Berner, 543 S.2d at 686 (allowing a cause of action on traditional tort negli-
gence principles when a woman brought an action against her former boyfriend alleging that he
either negligently or intentionally transmitted genital herpes to her).
148. In any event, the relationship between patients and their HCPs certainly must be closer
than that arising out of a "one night stand."
149. See Restatement §§ 291-293 (cited in note 24).
150. In Behringer, the Restatement's risk-utility approach was used to impose a duty on an
HCP to disclose his HIV status to patients. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton,
249 N.J. Super. 597, 592 A.2d 1251, 1281-83 (1991) (relying, in part, on Keyes, 16 J.C. & U.L. at
603-05 (cited in note 49)).
151. Restatement § 291 (cited in note 24) (Unreasonableness; How Determined; Magnitude
of Risk and Utility of Conduct) states: "Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recog-
nize as involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the
risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the
particular manner in which it is done."
152. Restatement § 292 (cited in note 24) (Factors Considered in Determining Utility of Ac-
tor's Conduct) states:
In determining what the law regards as the utility of the actor's conduct for the purpose
of determining whether the actor is negligent, the following factors are important:
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law attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or protected by the
conduct."' 53 "The conduct" with respect to both HCPs and patients is
nondisclosure of the party's infected status. The "interests" involved
are not limited to purely public interests, as a comment to Section 292
makes clear: "It may be a purely private interest of the actor or a third
person. It may be an interest which is primarily of private advantage,
but the public may nonetheless be interested, not merely as the protec-
tor of the private interest, but also because the general public good is
advanced by the protection and advancement of such private
interests.'
154
The public interest presumably served by nondisclosure by HCPs is
continued access to health care. In addition, nondisclosure serves the
private interests of HCPs in maintaining their privacy and confidential-
ity and their ability to continue practicing their professions. Interests in
privacy, confidentiality, and the privilege to practice one's profession
are not, however, purely private; they are also valued by society in
general.1
55
In contrast, relatively less social value is attached to nondisclosure
by patients. No public interest involved rivals the HCP's provision of
health care services. The patient's private interests in privacy, confiden-
tiality, and the potential consequences of general disclosure certainly
are no more significant than the interests of HCPs, and general disclo-
sure would result only if HCPs violate their duty of confidentiality to
their patients. Because, in contrast, patients have no duty to maintain
the confidences of their HCPs, it is quite probable that an HCP's dis-
closure to a patient will result in general disclosure. 56
The second factor Restatement Section 292 considers important in
assessing utility is "the extent of the chance that this interest will be
advanced or protected by the particular course of conduct.' 1 57 A single
disclosure by an HCP to a patient is likely to result in a loss of public
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interest which is to be advanced or
protected by the conduct;
(b) the extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced or protected by the partic-
ular course of conduct;
(c) the extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately advanced or protected
by'another and less dangerous course of conduct.
153. Id. § 292(a).
154. Id. cmt. a.
155. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law ch. 15 (Founda-
tion, 2d ed. 1988) (discussing the constitutional bases for rights of privacy and personhood);
id. § 15-13 (discussing the right to employment); John E. Nowak and Ronald D. Rotunda,
Constitutional Law § 16.36 (West, 4th ed. 1991) (discussing the publication of truthful pri-
vate information).
156. See note 95 and accompanying text.
157. Restatement § 292(b) (cited in note 24).
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access to health care and the HCP's personal loss of continued profes-
sional practice. Thus, the likelihood of advancing the interests noted
above is probably greater when HCPs do not disclose rather than when
patients do not disclose, because disclosure of patients' infected status
occurs only when HCPs breach patients' confidentiality.
The final important factor in the Restatement Section 292 utility
analysis is "the extent of the chance that such interest can be ade-
quately advanced or protected by another and less dangerous course of
conduct.' '158 Certainly HCPs other than the infected HCP may provide
health care. Moreover, the infected HCP's practice may be restricted to
noninvasive and less risky procedures, thereby minimizing the risk
while maintaining some of the utility afforded by the HCP's services.
Thus, the "less risky" alternative may require disclosure by HCPs. The
"less dangerous" alternative in the case of infected patients is to re-
quire patients to inform HCPs of their infected status and to rely upon
the legal obligation of HCPs to maintain this information in
confidence. 15
In sum, application of the Restatement factors indicates a greater
utility in nondisclosure on the part of HCPs than on the part of pa-
tients. In addition, in the vast majority of cases the public receives sig-
nificant benefits from health care even when provided by an infected
HCP, because the care is provided at a relatively low risk-indeed, at a
risk level substantially lower than the risk associated with ordinary
malpractice.
60
b. The Risk of Nondisclosure
Restatement Section 293 identifies four factors as important in as-
sessing the magnitude of risk associated with a particular course of con-
duct. 1 ' The first factor identified is "the social value which the law
158. Id. § 292(c).
159. In addition to the HCP's duty to maintain confidentiality based on the HCP-pa-
tient relation, 44 states and the District of Columbia have enacted HIV confidentiality protec-
tion statutes. See David A. Hansell, HIV Antibody Testing: Public Health Issues, in Paul
Albert, et al., eds., AIDS Practice Manual 3-14 n.63 (National Lawyers Guild, 3d ed. 1991).
160. See Harvard Study (cited in note 75) (indicating about a 1% incidence of medical
malpractice). This is not to say the risk is a reasonable one that may be imposed on patients.
The point is made only for purposes of comparative analysis.
161. Restatement § 293 (cited in note 24) (Factors Considered in Determining Magni-
tude of Risk) states:
In determining the magnitude of the risk for the purpose of determining whether the
actor is negligent, the following factors are important:
(a) the social value which the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled;
(b) the extent of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion of any interest
of the other or of one of a class of which the other is a member;
(c) the extent of the harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled;
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attaches to the interests which are imperiled.' 1 62 In the case of HCPs'
and patients' failure to warn of their infected (in particular, HIV) sta-
tus, the interest imperiled may be the life of the uninformed party. One
would hesitate to say that HCPs have a greater social value than pa-
tients-as a class or as individuals. Certainly society places a high value
on the provision of health 'care services, however, and there is no ques-
tion that society places a higher economic value on HCPs than on pa-
tients. 16 Accordingly, nondisclosure by patients presents a higher risk
than nondisclosure by HCPs in the context of whose life is imperiled.
The second Section 293 factor used in assessing risk is "the extent
of the chance that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion of any
interest of the other or of one of a class of which the other is a mem-
ber.' 64 In terms of probability, it is more likely that HCPs will be in-
fected by nondisclosing patients than the converse, according to
presently available data. The risk is three to nine times greater that an
HCP will be infected by a patient than that a patient will be infected
by an HCP.66
The third factor identified in Section 293 is "the extent of the
harm likely to be caused to the interests imperiled.' 1 66 HCPs and pa-
tients have an identical interest in life. Nonetheless, the loss of life of
an HCP, because of the HCP's higher earning capacity, will ordinarily
result in damages significantly in excess of those awarded for loss of life
of the average patient.
16 7
The fourth Restatement factor used in assessing risk is "the num-
ber of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes
effect in harm."' 68 This element is the only risk factor that appears to
render nondisclosure to patients by HCPs significantly more risky than
the converse-patients' failure to disclose to HCPs. Specifically, the
(d) the number of persons whose interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect
in harm.
162. Id. § 293(a).
163. For example, in 1988, the median weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers
over the age of 15 were $385, or approximately $20,020 per year. See U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 37 Employment and Earnings 219 (Jan. 1990). In the same year, the median
physician income was $144,700, the median surgeon income $207,500. Stuart M. Speiser, Recovery
for Wrongful Death: Economic Handbook § 8-2 at 103 (Lawyers Co-op, 3rd ed. 1988 & 1991 cum.
supp.). The median earnings of a surgeon are thus approximately ten times greater than those of
the average worker. See also John W. Wright and Edward S. Dwyer, The American Almanac of
Jobs and Salaries 246-52 (Avon, rev. ed. 1990-91) (noting that in 1987 the average dentist in gen-
eral practice earned a net income of $120,409, and the average M.D. netted $116,440, with cardio-
vascular surgeons at the top end of the scale with an average net income of $271,550 per year).
164. Restatement § 293(b) (cited in note 24).
165. See note 16.
166. Restatement § 293(c) (cited in note 24).
167. See note 181 and accompanying text.
168. Restatement § 293(d) (cited in note 24).
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CDC has estimated that, while the risk of HIV infection associated with
an infected HCP's performing an invasive procedure on a single patient
is between .0024 percent and .00024 percent,169 if the HCP performs
500 operations per year this risk increases to 1.2 percent.17 0 Over a
seven-year period, the CDC estimates that there would be an 8.1 per-
cent chance of infection from infected surgeons to patients.'" While the
risk of infection from HCPs to patients may be higher according to this
factor, however, many HCPs may be involved in the treatment of in-
fected patients. Therefore, multiple exposures to various HCPs in the
health care chain who are unaware of the"infected status of patients is
possible.1 2
In summary, while the fourth Restatement factor may indicate that
infected HCPs present a higher risk than do infected patients, the other
three factors indicate that infected patients present higher risks than
HCPs. The overall balancing of the magnitude of risk against the utility
of nondisclosure both by patients and by HCPs shows that the risk-
utility balance with respect to nondisclosure by patients is at least in
the same order of magnitude as that for nondisclosure by HCPs. 17 Ac-
cordingly, if a duty is imposed upon HCPs to disclose their infected
status to patients, a converse duty should also be imposed upon in-
fected patients to disclose to their HCPs.
3. Duty Based on Economic Analysis
Economic analysis employed in a comparative manner provides an-
other potentially useful method of analyzing whether patients should be
under a duty to disclose their infectious status to HCPs.17 4 The central
theorem of economic analysis in negligence law is Judge Learned
169. See CDC, Estimates at 7 (cited in note 16).
170. Id. The range of risk among specialties is estimated to be .2% to 2.8%.
171. Id. The range of risk among specialties is estimated to be 1% to 18.3%, assuming 3500
operations over seven years.
172. In addition to physicians and nurses, patients may be treated, inter alia, by radiology
technologists, medical laboratory technologists, respiratory therapists, phlebotomists, physical
therapists, occupational therapists, dentists, and podiatrists.
173. Comment b to § 291, with respect to burden of proof, states: "Conduct is not negligent
unless the magnitude of the risk involved therein so outweighs its utility as to make the risk unrea-
sonable." Restatement § 291 cmt. b (cited in note 24). This statement implies a balancing of the
risk and utility factors. The factor-balancing approach of the Restatement is made more explicit in
comment f to § 520 (Abnormally Dangerous Activities): "In determining whether the danger is
abnormal, the factors listed in ... this Section are all to be considered, and are all of importance.
Any one of them is not necessarily sufficient of itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of
them will be required for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not necessary that each of them
be present, especially if others weigh heavily." Id. § 520 cmt. fL
174. See generally Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law ch. 6 (Little, Brown, 4th ed.
1992); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law (Harvard
U., 1987).
1993] 1459
VANDERBILT LA W REVIEW
Hand's equation set forth in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.175 Ac-
cording to Judge Hand's analysis, conduct will be deemed negligent
when the burden (B) of taking precautions to avoid the occurrence of
injury is less than the product of the probability (P) that the injury will
occur in the absence of those precautions and the magnitude of injury
(L) that will occur. 176 Thus, precautions must be taken to satisfy eco-
nomic efficiency when it is cheaper to pay for the precautions to avoid
the loss than to pay for the loss itself.17 7 Hence, if this analysis is placed
in the form of an equation, liability for negligently caused loss will be
imposed when:
B<PxL.
If a duty is imposed on HCPs to inform patients of the HCP's in-
fected status, the equation would provide:
Bhcp < Phcp - p x Lp, where Bhc is the economic burden of disclo-
sure on HCPs, Phcp- p is the proba ility of injury due to exposure to
nondisclosing, infected HCPs, and Lp is the magnitude of loss to
patients.
If a duty is imposed on patients to disclose their infectious status to
HCPs, the equation would be:
Bp < Pp-hp x Lhcp, where Bp is the economic burden of disclosure
on patients, Pp-hcp is the probability of injury due to exposure to
nondisclosing, infected patients, and Lhcp is the magnitude of loss to
HCPs.
Substituting some numbers from available studies into the equa-
tions is useful for comparative analysis. According to CDC estimates,
175. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law §§ 6.1-6.4 (cited in
note 174); Landes and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 85-107 (cited in note 174).
176. The question in Carroll Towing was whether an employee would be liable for the loss of
a barge that broke away during its bargee's absence. In this context Judge Hand stated:
Since there are occasions when every vessel will break from her moorings, and since, if she
does, she becomes a menace to those about her; the owner's duty, as in other similar situa-
tions, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability
that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of
adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic
terms: if the probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon
whether B is less than L multiplied by P: i.e., whether B < PL.
Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
Landes and Posner indicate that the "correct economic standard of negligence" is the "margi-
nal" form of the Hand formula. Thus, in the formula the "marginal cost of care" would be substi-
tuted for B ("the burden or costs of precautions"), and "the marginal reduction in accident
damage" would be substituted for PL ("the expected damages from the accident"). See Landes
and Posner, Economic Structure of Tort Law at 87 (cited in note 174). Because this Article under-
takes a comparative analysis, the original Hand formula will be employed.
177. In the marginal form, "it is negligent to use a level of care at which the marginal cost of
accident avoidance is less than the marginal benefit from avoidance." Landes and Posner, Eco-
nomic Structure of Tort Law at 87.
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the probability of a surgeon infecting a patient during the course of an
operation is in the range of one in 42,000 to one in 417,000.178 This
equation yields a probability Phcp- of between 2.38 x 10 -5 and 2.3 x
10-6. In the converse situation, in which infection occurs from patient to
surgeon, the CDC estimates a higher probability ranging from one out
of 4500 to one out of 130,000.79 Thus, the probability Pp-hcp ranges be-
tween 2.22 x 10 -4 and 7.6 x 10-6. The ratio (Rp) of the probability of a
patient transmitting infection to an HCP (P-hcp) to the probability of
an HCP transmitting infection to a patient (Phcp- ) ranges from 9.25 to
3.3.180 Accordingly, the probability of an HCP eing infected by a pa-
tient is between three and nine times greater than the converse.
The same type of comparative analysis can be performed with re-
spect to loss (L). If, for purposes of convenience, damages are limited to
those resulting from loss of earnings, assuming that other factors such
as age and special and general damages are held constant, HCPs may
earn in the order of five to ten times the amoun.t of the average working
population in damages."1 Thus, the ratio (R1) of loss to HCPs (Lhcp) to
loss to patients (Lp) is in the range of five to ten.
Multiplying the ratio of probability (Rp) and the ratio of l6ss (R2)
results in a product (Rpl) of expected damages ranging approximately
between sixteen and ninety-two.18 2 In terms of the burden of taking
precautions (B), this means that if an HCP were considered to be negli-
gent in failing to inform a patient of the HCP's infected status, then a
patient must undertake a burden sixteen to ninety-two times as great to
avoid being found negligent.'
8s
What, then, are the relative burdens placed upon HCPs and pa-
tients to avoid liability? As previously indicated in the risk-utility anal-
ysis, if HCPs must disclose their infected status, this means essentially
178. See note 16. It should be understood that the present analysis is limited to the
probability of a surgeon infecting a patient and vice versa, because of the availability of estimates
of risk. The methodology, however, would be the same for other HCP-patient relationships.
179. Id.
180. That is: Rp/hep - P p/hcp 2.22 x 10-
4 to 7.6 x 10-6
Phcp/p = 2.38 x 10-
5 to 2.3 x 10.6
RP/hcP = 9.25 to 3.3
181. The higher factor 10 is based upon comparing the median annual earnings of surgeons
(approximately $200,000) to the median annual earnings of all workers (approximately $20,000).
The factor five is based upon comparing the median earnings of all physicians (over $100,000) to
that of all workers. See note 163. It is, of course, true that many HCPs (for example, nurses and
radiology technicians) would not have earnings of such magnitude, but these HCPs are less likely
to be involved in invasive procedures.
182. That is: R = R xP, = 3.3 x 5 to 9.25 x 10
R 16.5 to 92.5.
183. Stated another way, economic efficiency would permit the expenditure of approximately
16 to 92 times as much in terms of precautions (B) to avoid HCPs' being infected by noninforming
patients compared to the converse, with each party incurring the respective expected damage (PL).
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loss of their professional careers. 84 HCPs can, of course, voluntarily
withdraw from performing invasive procedures and limit their practices
to areas in which there is (presumably) essentially, no risk of transmis-
sion. Such a course of conduct may result, however, in significant finan-
cial loss as well as the likelihood that patients still might refuse to be
treated once word of the HCP's infectious status is out.185
In contrast, if a duty is placed upon patients to disclose their in-
fected status, the burden imposed on them consists only of the risk of
confidentiality being breached by the HCP. This burden would also in-
clude the risk attendant to the dissemination of that information
throughout the health care system in which the patient is treated.' 6 If
a breach of confidentiality occurs, the potential for loss to patients is
quite significant. However, the enactment of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA)'8 7 has significantly undermined the argument that
disclosure by the patient will result in the HCP's refusal to provide
treatment. The ADA classifies persons with HIV disease as disabled,
and therefore imposes a duty on HCPs to treat them.' 88 Moreover,
184. See text accompanying notes 155-60.
185. See notes 6 and 31.
186. For example, if the patient is hospitalized and the patient's HIV status charted, a large
number of HCPs and other hospital personnel may have access to the chart.
187. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1993).
188. While it was unclear under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973), whether the
term "handicap" covered persons with HIV disease, there is little question that the ADA's defini-
tion of "disability" includes such individuals. The text of the ADA does not specifically refer to
HIV or AIDS; however, comments to 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) do: "[A] person infected with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus is covered under the first prong of the definition of the term
'disability' because of a substantial limitation to procreation and intimate sexual relationships."
H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
334. See generally David W. Webber, AIDS in the Workplace, in AIDS and the Law 45 (Wiley, 2d
ed. 1992) (discussing federal and state legal standards applicable to AIDS in the workplace); Jill
Cohen, Access to Medical Care for HIV-Infected Individuals Under the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act: A Duty to Treat, 18 Am. J. L. & Med. 233 (1992) (discussing common-law and statutory
duties to treat people infected with HIV); Kenneth E. Labowitz, Refusal to Treat HIV-AIDS Pa-
tients: What Are the Legal Obligations?, 28 Trial 58 (Mar. 1992) (discussing AIDS under the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA). See also Joel Neugarten, The Americans with Disabilities Act:
Magic Bullet or Band-aid for Patients and Healthcare Workers Infected with the Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus?, 57 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1277 (1992).
The ADA subchapter entitled "Prohibition of Discrimination by Public Accommodations"
states as a general rule: "No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommo-
dations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
operates a place of public accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). "Public accommodation" ex-
pressly includes "professional office of a healthcare provider, hospital, or other service establish-
ment." Id. § 12181(7)(F). Therefore, the private physician's office is included under the ADA and
the private doctor cannot discriminate based on HIV or AIDS, irrespective of whether the doctor
receives federal funds. See Labowitz, 28 Trial at 59. This is not to say that AIDS patients face no
real risk of being refused treatment by HCPs. See Mark Jackson and Nan D. Hunter, "The Very
Fabric of Health Care". The Duty of Healthcare Providers to Treat People Infected with HIV, in
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HCPs have an ethical responsibility to treat infected individuals; an
HCP's refusal to treat without justification may result in the imposition
of professional sanctions.'89 In any event, in comparing the burdens im-
posed respectively on HCPs and patients to inform the other of infec-
tious status, it appears reasonably clear that the burden is greater on
HCPs than on patients.
In summary, economic analysis suggests that if a duty is imposed
on HCPs to disclose their infectious status, a duty should also be im-
posed on patients to disclose their infectious status to their HCPs, be-
cause disclosure imposes a relatively lower burden on patients than
physicians, while failure to inform creates a higher probability of injury
and greater loss to HCPs than to patients.
C. The Elements of a Cause of Action Based on Reverse Informed
Consent
1. The Standard of Care
A duty imposed upon patients to disclose their infected status to
HCPs according to one of the foregoing duty analyses would of course
not be absolute. As in the case of direct informed consent, the duty of
disclosure should be limited to material risks. No duty should be im-
posed on patients to disclose their infected status to an HCP undertak-
ing a non-invasive procedure, such as a blood pressure test. This
analysis raises the question of what standard courts should use to judge
the patient's duty to disclose. It would be inappropriate to impose a
professional standard of care on patients in regard to what constitutes a
AIDS Agenda at 123 (cited in note 18) (listing instances of and reasons for HCP refusals to treat
HIV patients).
189. The official policy of the American Medical Association states: "A physician may not
ethically refuse to treat a patient whose condition is within the physician's current realm of com-
petence solely because the patient is seropositive for HIV. Persons who are seropositive should not
be subjected to discrimination based on fear or prejudice." American Medical Association, Anno-
tated Current Opinions of the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical
Association 85 (1992). The American Dental Association has a similar position: "A dentist has the
general obligation to provide care to those in need. A decision not to provide treatment to an
individual because the individual has AIDS or is HIV seropositive, based solely on that fact, is
unethical." American Dental Association, Principles of Ethics and Code of Professional Conduct,
in Gorlin, ed., Codes of Professional Responsibility at 161 (cited in note 115). On the ethical duty
to treat AIDS patients, see generally Walter J. Friedlander, On the Obligation of Physicians to
Treat AIDS: Is There a Historical Basis?, 12 Rev. Infect. Dis. 191 (1990); Oscar W. Clarke and
Robert B. Conley, The Duty to 'Attend Upon the Sick,' 266 JAMA 2876 (1991); Edmund D. Pel-
ligrino, HIV Infection and the Ethics of Clinical Care, 10 J. Legal Med. 29 (1989); Bernard Lo,
Obligations to Care for Persons with Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 4 Issues L. & Med. 367
(1988). See also Jackson and Hunter, AIDS Agenda at 136 (cited in note 18) (discussing the impo-
sition of disciplinary sanctions on HCPs for refusal to treat infectious patients).
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material risk.190 A reasonable person standard, which, according to the
Restatement formulation, would require the exercise of "such attention,
perception of the circumstances, memory, knowledge of other pertinent
matters, intelligence and judgment" possessed by reasonable persons,
would be justifiable.' 9' In addition, the Restatement would hold indi-
viduals who have "superior attention, perception, memory, knowledge,
intelligence and judgment" to a superior standard.' 2 This higher stan-
dard is significant because people inflicted with a particular disease
often have a considerable body of information concerning that
disease.'
2. The Causation Requirement: A Double-Edged Sword
Assuming that patients would be negligent in failihg to inform
HCPs of material risks, such as their HIV status, the critical require-
ment of causation must be satisfied in order to sustain liability on the
theory of reverse informed consent. This issue is relatively simple when
analyzed in the traditional context of informed consent running from
HCP to patient. The sine qua non of giving consent to treatment is the
patient being informed of the material risks of that treatment. Whether
a particular patient would not have consented to treatment after having
been informed of a material risk is a question of fact-either based
upon the majority standard of the reasonable person or the minority
subjective standard of the particular patient.1
9
4
With respect to HCPs the causation issue is considerably more dif-
ficult. The arguments against causation have a double edge. First, be-
cause HCPs have both an ethical and a legal duty (unless an exception
applies) to proceed with treatment even when informed of the infec-
tious status of their patients, disclosure would be irrelevant.' 95 Second,
even if the HCP had been informed of the infectious status of the pa-
190. Patients as a class obviously cannot be expected to have the "skill and knowledge nor-
mally possessed by members" of the health care professions. See Restatement § 299A (cited in
note 24) (Undertaking in Profession or Trade): "Unless he represents that he has greater or less
skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is
required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profession or
trade in good standing in similar communities."
191. Id. § 289(a).
192. Id. § 289(b).
193. For example, diabetics-out of necessity-must manage their own diseases and thus
must know how to monitor blood sugar, calculate insulin, select diet, and seek help for destabi-
lizing infections. It may be expected that people with AIDS will be quite familiar with the newest
experimental drugs and treatments for AIDS. Infected HCPs, of course, would or should have a
professional level of knowledge about their infectious status.
194. See text accompanying notes 32-33.
195. Lawrence Gostin, HIV-Infected Physicians and the Practice of Seriously Invasive Pro-
cedures, 19 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 32, 34-35 (Jan.-Feb. 1989).
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tient, the HCP neither would have nor could have taken greater care in
performing the treatment, because universal precautions provide ade-
quate protection and no less risky alternatives are available.
198
With respect to the first argument, an ethical or legal duty imposed
on HCPs to treat infectious patients does not necessarily impose a duty
on HCPs to treat those who refuse to disclose a known infectious condi-
tion. Reasonable HCPs are likely to ask, in the course of taking pa-
tients' medical histories, whether the patients have an infectious
disease, have been tested, or have had any symptoms of an infectious
disease. 197 If a patient refuses to answer or if the patient's answers rea-
sonably appear deceptive or ambiguous, the HCP should not have a
duty to accept this person as a patient or to proceed with treatment.
Presumably, the law has not gone so far as to hold that HCPs must
accept any and all persons as patients without requiring that potential
patients disclose their HIV status. 98 The right to refuse patients be-
comes particularly important in a legal regime in which, once a poten-
tial patient discloses a seropositive status, HCPs have a legal duty to
accept that person as a patient and proceed with treatment if compe-
tent to do so.19 The intent of antidiscrimination statutes designed to
benefit the disabled does not require HCPs to accept patients who re-
fuse to disclose their infectious status. 0
In addition, if patients refuse to disclose their infectious status, in
certain instances it becomes impossible for HCPs to determine whether
196. Id. See also Eisenstat, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. at 331-32 n.155 (cited in note 49) (arguing
that because HCPs should use universal precautions, they have no need to know a patient's HIV
status).
197. This Article does not suggest that this questioning should be a "fishing expedition."
Questions asked should be medically or professionally indicated so that the HCP may appropri-
ately diagnose and treat the individual both for the safety of the individual and that of the HCP.
See Abe M. Macher, HIV Disease/AIDS: Medical Background, in AIDS and the Law § 1.9 at 14
(Wiley, 2d ed. 1992) (Suggested Guidelines for Presumption Diagnosis of Diseases Indicative of
AIDS).
198. Indeed, the AMA gives the principle of professional autonomy ethical status: "A physi-
cian shall, in the provision of appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose
whom to serve, with whom to associate, and the environment in which to provide medical ser-
vices." American Medical Association, Principles of Medical Ethics, adopted July 22, 1980, Princi-
ple VI, in Gorlin, ed., Codes of Professional Responsibility at 191 (cited in note 115). See also
Friedlander, 12 Rev. Infect. Dis. at 196 (cited in note 189) (discussing the conflict between the
freedom to choose patients, which was added to the AMA Code in the 1912 revision, and the duty
to treat patients even during an epidemic).
199. See note 188 (discussing the ADA).
200. For example, the ADA affords standing to invoke the enforcement procedures against
HCPs only to "any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in
violation" of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (cited in note 187). It is not apparent whether per-
sons who refuse to disclose their "disability" would qualify.
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a proposed treatment is appropriate for a patient with that infection.20 1
The justification for requiring patients to disclose is not merely to pro-
tect HCPs against undertaking a procedure that might present a risk to
themselves; disclosure also protects the infectious person by enabling
HCPs to determine that a particular course of treatment is profession-
ally appropriate. Moreover, the patient's failure to disclose eliminates
the HCP's opportunity, within the professional standard of care, to re-
fer the patient to someone better qualified to provide the appropriate
treatment.2 02 Indeed, some state statutes authorize physicians to test
patients for HIV, under certain circumstances, without the patient's
consent; such statutes reflect a public policy to protect both patients
and HCPs.
20 3
201. See, for example, Kathryn L. McCance and Sue E. Huether, eds., Pathophysiology: The
Biologic Bases for Disease in Adults and Children 265-66 (Mosby, 1990) (stating, "The clinical
hallmark of immune deficiency is a tendency to develop unusual or recurrent, severe infections....
[E]ven simple procedures, such as penetrating the skin for routine blood tests, may lead to fatal
septicemia (bacterial infection of the blood) in the immune-deficient person.").
202. If the HCP is informed of the patient's status, it may indeed constitute malpractice not
to refer the patient if the HCP is unqualified to treat the patient. See, for example, Pegalis and
Wachsman, American Law of Medical Malpractice at § 3:10 (cited in note 3). The Hippocratic
oath recognizes the ethical duty to refer: "I will not use the knife, not even on sufferers from stone,
but will withdraw in favor of such men as are engaged in such work." The Report of the House
Committee on Education and Labor contains an exception to the duty to treat protected patients,
which states: "Nothing in this legislation is intended to prohibit ... a physician from referring a
patient with a disability to another physician if that patient is seeking treatment outside the doc-
tor's specialization and if the doctor would make a similar referral for an individual without that
disability." H.R. Rep. No. 101-485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. at 105-06 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 388-89. Compare State by Beaulieu v. Clausen, 491 N.W.2d 662 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that a dentist's referral of an HIV-positive patient to another dental facility vio-
lated a state human rights act; the referral was a mere pretext for discrimination because the
dentist could have used the same universal precautions).
The ADA itself contains a second exception: "Nothing in this subchapter shall require an
entity to permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, [and] facilities.
. of such entity where such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others. The
term 'direct threat' means a significant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be elimi-
nated by a modification of policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or
services." 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (cited in note 187). The argument against disclosure to HCPs
claims that HCPs may then assert that they are unqualified to treat the patient's particular
condition.
203. See, for example, Illinois AIDS Confidentiality Act, 410 ILCS 305/8 (Smith-Hurd, 1993)
(stating that "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Sections 4 and 5 of this Act, written informed
consent, information and counseling are not required for the performance of an HIV test: ... (b)
when in the judgment of the physician, such testing is medically indicated to provide appropriate
diagnosis and treatment to the subject of the test, provided that the subject of the test has other-
wise provided his or her consent to such physician for medical treatment"); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1300.13(F)(4) (West, 1992) (providing for HIV-related testing without written consent
"[w]hen, in the medical opinion of the physician requesting the HIV-related test, the request for
informed consent to perform such test would be medically contraindicated"); Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 81.103(b)(5) (Vernon, 1992) (noting that, as an exception to the requirement of confi-
dentiality, the results of an AIDS test may be released to "a physician, nurse, or other health care
personnel who have a legitimate need to know the test result in order to provide for their protec-
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According to the second prong of the causation argument, even if
the HCP had been informed before proceeding with the treatment, the
HCP could have exercised no greater degree of care to protect herself
from infection from the patient. This argument would be difficult to
rebut if universal precautions were universal in their protection and
universal in their use. Neither, of course, is true. Universal precautions
do not absolutely protect either HCPs or patients.2 04 For example, in
tion and to provide for the patient's health and welfare"); R.I. Gen. Laws § 23-6-14(e) (1992)
(providing that an HCP may test for AIDS "[uln a licensed healthcare facility or in the private
office of a physician in the event that an exposure evaluation group ... determines that a health
care provider has a significant exposure to the blood... of a patient and the patient.., refuses to
grant informed consent for an HIV test. . ."); Miss. Code Ann. § 41-41-16 (1992) (stating that "[a]
hospital or physician, and employees of such hospital or physician, may conduct an acquired im-
mune deficiency syndrome ... antibody test ... without specific consent for such tests if the
hospital or physician determines that the test is necessary for diagnostic purposes to provide ap-
propriate care or treatment to the person to be tested, or in order to protect the health and safety
of other patients or persons providing care and treatment to the person to be tested"); Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 381.004(3)(i)(4,8,10,11) (West, 1992) (providing that informed consent is not required
"[flor the performance of an HIV-related test by licensed medical personnel for medical diagnosis
of acute illness where, in the opinion of the attending physician, the obtaining of informed consent
would be detrimental to the patient. . ."). Compare N.C. Gen. Stat. § 130A-148(h) (1992) (provid-
ing that "[a] test for AIDS ... may also be performed upon any person [by] ... a physician...
who is rendering medical services to that person when, in the reasonable medical judgment of the
physician, the test is necessary for the appropriate treatment of the person; however, the person
shall be informed that a test for AIDS virus infection is to be conducted, and shall be given clear
opportunity to refuse to submit to the test prior to it being conducted, and further if informed
consent is not obtained, the test may not be perfirmed").
The AMA's position states that "[e]xplicit consent should not always be required prior to HIV
testing .... [However,] [p]hysicians must be aware that most states have enacted laws requiring
informed consent before HIV testing." American Medical Association, Proceedings of the House of
Delegates, 141st Annual Meeting 97 (June 21-25, 1992) (copy on file with the Author) ("AMA,
Proceedings'). In its report and recommendations, the AMA explicitly listed the actual consent
requirements in the 50 states, noting that Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Illi-
nois, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin all provide for some exception when a "patient may have
exposed a healthcare worker." Id. at 93, Table 1.
204. Universal precautions are defined to include the following:
All health-care workers should routinely use appropriate barrier precautions to prevent skin
and mucous-membrane exposure when contact with blood or other body fluids of any patient
is anticipated. Gloves should be worn for touching blood and body fluids, mucous membranes,
or non-intact skin of all patients, for handling items or surfaces soiled with blood or body
fluids, and for performing venipuncture and other vascular access procedures.... Masks and
protective eyewear or face shields should be worn during procedures that are likely to gener-
ate droplets of blood or other body fluids to prevent exposure of mucous membranes of the
mouth, nose, and eyes.
Centers for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Services, Recommendations for
Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, 36 Morbidity & Mortality Wkly. Rep.
3, 5-6 (Supp. Aug. 21, 1987). See id. at 6 for a more detailed list of universal precautions.
While the CDC recommends universal precautions and OSHA mandates them (see 29 C.F.R.
§ 1910.1030(d), which states that "[u]niversal precautions shall be observed to prevent contact
with blood or other potentially infectious materials"), the precautions do not always protect. Ap-
proximately 100,000 accidental needle stick injuries occur in the United States every year. See Jule
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State University,20 5 a resident assisting in surgery was cut through his
surgical glove by the surgeon, potentially exposing the patient to the
HIV-infected blood of the resident. In Boulais v. Lustig, gloves would
not have prevented the surgeon's scalpel from cutting the finger of the
surgical technician, risking potential infection from a patient who had
undisclosed AIDS.20  In addition, numerous studies have shown that
Louise Gerberding, Reducing Occupational Risk of HIV Infection, 26 Hosp. Practice 103, 108
(June 15, 1991) (reporting that double-gloving can reduce inner glove perforations by 80%). For a
discussion of the need for strict precautions, see Walter E. Finkbeiner, A Pound of Prevention
When There Isn't a Cure, 115 Archives Pathology Lab. Med. 762, 762 (1991) (stating that "[c]ut
injuries.., are likely to be the most common mode of transmission of blood-borne pathogens such
as human immunodeficiency virus and hepatitis B virus").
Universal precautions often cannot prevent puncture injuries. One study found that the me-
dian injury rate in surgery was 4.2 cuts per 1000 operating hours. Assuming a 5% patient infection
rate, the estimated HIV seroconversion rate of surgeons with over 30 years of practice is less than
1% for 50%, 1 to 2% for 25%, 2 to 6% for 15%, and greater than 6% for 10%. Albert B. Lowen-
fels, Gary P. Wormser, Rajesh Jain, Frequency of Puncture Injuries in Surgeons and Estimated
Risk of HIV Infection, 124 Archives Surgery 1284, 1286 (1989). Lowenfels's study reported that, in
addition to puncture wounds, 74% of the surgeons interviewed reported one or more episodes per
year in which their gowns became soaked with blood, 72% had blood on their hands at the conclu-
sion of surgery, and 46% had performed surgery that resulted in an abrasion or cut. Id. at 1285.
See also Mary E. Willy, et al., Adverse Exposures and Universal Precautions Practices Among a
Group of Highly Exposed Health Professionals, 11 Infection Control Hosp. Epidemiology 351
(1990) (noting that of those responding to the survey, 74% had soiled their bands with blood at
least once within the last six months, 51% had splashed blood or amniotic fluid in their faces, and
24% reported one or more needlestick injuries). Another study of a 700-bed general hospital con-
cluded that: "The three infection control programs failed to produce a major reduction in reported
needlestick injuries, except for a decrease in recapping injuries associated with the placement of
rigid sharps disposal containers in all patient rooms. These observations indicate that new ap-
proaches are needed to reduce needlestick injuries." Calvin C. Linnemann, et al., Effect of Educa-
tional Programs, Rigid Sharps Containers, and Universal Precautions on Reported Needlestick
Injuries in Healthcare Workers, 12 Infection Control Hosp. Epidemiology 214, 214 (1991). See also
Janine Jagger, Do Universal Precautions Reduce Needlestick Injuries?, 266 JAMA 359, 360 (1991)
(letter to the editor) (stating that "[t]here is a growing body of evidence indicating that [universal
precautions] alone are not sufficient to reduce the risk of needlestick injuries"). But see Edward S.
Wong, et al., Are Universal Precautions Effective in Reducing the Number of Occupational Expo-
sures Among Health Care Workers?, 265 JAMA 1123, 1123 (1991) (noting that implementing uni-
versal precautions led to a decrease in the number of exposure incidents that resulted in direct
contact with blood and body fluids from 5.07 to 2.66 exposures per physician per patient care
month).
Further, surgical gloves often contain holes or pores regardless of puncture. One study of latex
gloves reported that "[t]he safranin test was positive in 27 of 28 (96.4%) leaky gloves tested, indi-
cating a high risk of exposure to potentially infected fluids when leaky gloves are used."
Bienvenido G. Yangco and Nathaniel F. Yangco, What Is Leaky Can Be Risky: A Study of the
Integrity of Hospital Gloves, 10 Infection Control Hosp. Epidemiology 553, 553 (1989). The author
concluded, "There is a need for the Food and Drug Administration to establish more stringent
guidelines for manufacturing gloves and to verify compliance with these guidelines." Id.
205. 407 Pa. Super. 565, 595 A.2d 1290 (1991), appeal granted, 531 Pa. 640, 611 A.2d 712
(1992).
206. See note 123. Neither the surgeon nor the technician was wearing gloves during the
procedure. The jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff, must have found that wearing
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universal precautions are not universally used.2 °7 Common sense, how-
ever, suggests that HCPs would be more likely to adhere more rigor-
ously to universal precautions when aware of the infectious status of
their patients than when they treat "generic" patients.
If the professional standard of care requires use of universal pre-
cautions with respect to all patients for all invasive procedures,10 then
contributory negligence may be asserted as a defense by a noninform-
ing, infected patient if an HCP fails to use the required precautions.
Nonetheless, the patient would still bear the burden of proving causa-
tion-that the use of such precautions would have prevented the HCP
from becoming infected. 20 1 The defense of assumption of risk, of course,
gloves would not have prevented the cut. The jury did find the plaintiff 1% at fault, possibly based
on her failure to wear gloves, or perhaps based on her having her hand in the wrong place. See note
121.
207. A study to determine whether adherence to universal precautions improved after educa-
tional programs revealed that the number of infractions actually rose from 57% to 58%. Kenneth
R. Courington, Sarah L. Patterson, and Richard J. Howard, Universal Precautions Are Not Uni-
versally Followed, 126 Archives Surgery 93, 93 (1991). Before the educational programs, infrac-
tions with regard to universal precautions occurred in 75% of operating room procedures, 30% of
surgical ward procedures, and 75% of surgical intensive care unit procedures. After the education
programs, the rates of infraction incidence were 81%, 32%, and 40%, respectively. Id. Therefore,
only in surgical intensive care unit procedures did the educational programs appear to have any
effect. Compare Gabor D. Kelen, et al., Substantial Improvement in Compliance with Universal
Precautions in an Emergency Department Following Institution of Policy, 151 Archives Internal
Med. 2051, 2051 (1991) (finding that compliance with universal precautions rose from 44% to
72.77% after department policy made the procedures mandatory; nonetheless, in over 25% of the
cases, universal precautions were not used).
Another area of significant noncompliance concerns the recapping of needles. The CDC's rec-
ommendation noted that universal precautions mandate that needles never be recapped. In one
study, however, researchers concluded that the percentage of recapped needles in disposal boxes
always exceeded 25%; the percentage exceeded 50% in four instances. Marshall H. Becker, et al.,
Noncompliance with Universal Precautions Policy: Why Do Physicians and Nurses Recap Need-
les?, 18 Am. J. Infection Control 232, 232 (1990).
Another study concerned the "representative population of healthcare workers who were
thought likely to have frequent and intensive exposures to blood and other bodily fluids." Of those
responding to a survey, 74% had soiled their hands with blood at least once in the last six months,
51% had splashed blood in their faces, and 24% had needle stick injuries. Despite this, and despite
high levels of expert training and knowledge, roughly only one-half (55%) reported compliance
with universal precautions. The study concluded that development of new strategies for universal
precaution compliance was essential. Willy, et al., 11 Infection Control Hosp. Epidemiology at 351
(cited in note 204). See also Gabor D. Kelen, et al., Adherence to Universal (Barrier) Precautions
During Interventions on Critically Ill and Injured Emergency Department Patients, 3 J. Acquir.
Immune Defic. Syndr. 987, 987 (1990), in which a study found that HCPs fully adhered to univer-
sal precautions only 44% of the time. Even more disturbing, the study revealed that only 19.5%
compliance occurred during interventions with profuse bleeding. Reasons offered for noncompli-
ance included lack of time (from 47% of those not adhering), the claim that precautions interfered
with procedures (33%), and the claim that the materials associated with universal precautions
were "uncomfortable" (23%). Id.
208. See note 204 (noting the CDC definition of universal precautions).
209. In Boulais v. Lustig, 1992 Cal. LEXIS 65 (1992), the use of universal precautions evi-
dently would not have prevented the injury. See note 206.
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would require that the HCP have actual knowledge of the patient's in-
fectious status. In short, HCPs clearly have a greater incentive from the
standpoint of self-interest to employ universal precautions when they
have knowledge of the patient's infectious condition than when they
neither know nor have reason to know.
Whether HCPs will or can take increased care to avoid infections is
questionable when it is well known that universal precautions do fail.
More specifically, the issue is whether HCPs would use a higher degree
of care in treating known infectious patients than in treating those pa-
tients about whom they have no knowledge. Tort law, economic theory,
and common sense lead to the conclusion that HCPs would take a
higher degree of care when dealing with an infectious patient when
there is some recognizable risk of transmission; HCPs would likely take
a lesser degree of care when there is no risk of infection. As Dean Pros-
ser stated, "As the gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent
likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less to generate a
duty of precaution."21 0 Whether knowledge of the infected status of a
patient will prevent injury is not the issue; rather, the reverse informed
consent analysis is concerned with the question whether HCPs should
be deprived of the opportunity to exercise care for their self-protection
in direct proportion to the risk posed by infected patients.
In terms of economic theory, increasing expenditures for accident
avoidance are economically justified as the expected damages from an
accident increase (that is, as the probability of loss times the magnitude
of loss increases).21' Stated simply, additional care is economically justi-
fied when an increased probability of significant loss exists. Because the
risk of infection is at least marginally higher when patients have not
informed their HCPs, HCPs' higher expenditures for care of nondisclos-
ing patients are economically justified.212
210. Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts at 171 (footnote omitted) (cited in note 13).
211. See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 148-51 (cited in note 174), for the marginal
form of this proposition.
212. On the other hand, the vast majority of patients are not infected; therefore, the use of
universal precautions for all patients in order to vindicate patients' right not to disclose does not
seem to be economically justified. Universal precautions have been estimated to add hundreds of
millions of dollars in additional costs per year to already burgeoning healthcare costs: "Infection
control costs more than doubled after implementations of universal precautions. . ." Universal
Precautions Reduce Worker Exposures, Help Raise Costs, Hosp. Infection Control 147, 187 (Nov.
1989). See also Bradley N. Doebbeling and Richard P. Wenzel, The Direct Costs of Universal
Precautions in a Teaching Hospital, 264 JAMA 2083, 2083 (1990) (stating that "[u]niversal pre-
cautions are estimated to have cost at least $336 million in the United States in fiscal year 1989
after adjustment for inflation"). Compare Steve Taravella, OSHA, CDC Issue Rules on Infection
Control, 21 Mod. Healthcare 3, 3 (Dec. 9, 1991) (stating that "[e]mployers-mainly health facili-
ties, medical offices and correctional sites-will spend $821 million annually to comply, OSHA
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One commentator has made an argument, presumably based on
common sense, that HCPs may be more likely to act negligently if in-
formed of the infectious status of their patients because of the in-
creased stress associated with treating such patients. 13 This approach
to health care appears to ignore the "under the circumstances" require-
ment used to evaluate whether an HCP's conduct is negligent. One may
seriously question the common sense of witholding any information
from HCPs that might affect their well being, let alone that of their
patients.
In short, the fact that HCPs may not be able to refuse to treat
infectious patients does not preclude the establishment of a causal rela-
tionship between a patient's failure to inform and damages suffered by
an HCP. This causal relationship may be established by the fact that
HCPs may refuse to treat the patient, or may refuse to undertake a
particular procedure that, according to the appropriate professional
standard, is contraindicated for an infectious person. In addition, pa-
tients' failure to disclose their infectious status denies HCPs the oppor-
tunity to treat patients in a more careful manner. But for the patient's
failure to disclose, the HCP would have employed a standard of care
(more protective of the HCP) appropriate to the increased probability
of loss due to the infected condition of the patient.
3. Damages
The final element necessary to complete a cause of action based
upon reverse informed consent is damages suffered by the HCP as a
consequence of the patient's failure to disclose. The clearest case for
recovery arises when an HCP actually becomes infected as a conse-
quence of treating a patient who fails to disclose infected status. Addi-
estimated"). These anticipated extra costs could be devastating to hospitals and medical institu-
tions already in severe financial crises. Id.
Predicting the costs of universal precautions is often very difficult, making it harder for health
care providers to plan ahead financially because they are unable to predict accurately overhead
costs of operation. See Universal Precautions' Cost Exceeds Estimates-Study, 20 Mod. Health-
care 13, 13 (Oct. 29, 1990). OSHA had estimated that hospitals would have to spend $195 million
to comply with universal precautions in 1989, but the actual costs of compliance were $299 million.
OSHA's estimated figure was off by more than one-third (35%). Id. In American Dental Associa-
tion v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1993), the court indicated that the $821 million compliance
costs estimated by OSHA would not break the health care industry.
213. See Gostin, 48 Md. L. Rev. at 29 (cited in note 6) (stating that "[i]ndeed, knowledge
that a patient is HIV-positive may well increase the occupational risk to HCPs, perhaps because
the HCP is overly conscious of the threat of HIV and thus becomes hesitant and awkward"). It
appears to be mere conjecture that HCPs, who are accustomed to stress, would be more careful
and more competent in treating a patient if they did not know of the patient's infected condition.
Compare Eisenstat, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. at 331-32 n.155 (cited in note 49) (arguing against
mandatory testing of patients "since it would create a false sense of security among HC[P]s").
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tionally, awarding damages to HCPs for fear of contracting the
infectious disease seems at least comparable to the converse situation in
which a patient is exposed to an infected HCP. 14 Indeed, HCPs in-
volved in the treatment of infected patients may have a heightened fear
of infection because of repeated opportunities for exposure and their
knowledge of the devastating progression of the disease. One would also
presume that because of their professional knowledge, HCPs would be
aware of the need and the ethical responsibility for undergoing testing
in appropriate circumstances. 15
In summary, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, it appears that
reverse informed consent may provide a viable cause of action for HCPs
who are infected as a result of treating patients who fail to inform their
HCPs of their infected status. The cause of action may not be as
straightforward nor as compelling, perhaps, as that based upon the
traditional duty running from HCPs to their patients. Nonetheless, the
adoption of the reverse informed consent doctrine appears to be justifi-
able within traditional tort theory and analysis; in addition, the doc-
trine effectuates public policy and the ethical principles of
nonmaleficence, autonomy, and justice, which apply equally to HCPs
and patients.
IV. LIMITS OF CivIL LIABILITY
As mentioned in the Introduction, the judicial system is often
forced to deal with problems that the executive and legislative branches
do not have the political will to address.21 6 Thus, however imperfectly
214. See notes 79-93 and accompanying text (discussing damages).
215. The American Medical Association announced its latest position with respect to HIV
testing at its 1992 Summer Annual Meeting. The AMA remained opposed to mandatory testing of
physicians. AMA, Proceedings at 97 (cited in note 203). The Board of Trustees further recom-
mended that "[a]ny physician who performs patient care procedures that pose a significant risk of
transmission of HIV infection should voluntarily determine his/her serostatus at intervals appro-
priate to risk." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the AMA has made it an ethical consideration for
physicians to test themselves for HIV, although this testing is voluntary. The recommendations
further state that the HIV-infected physician should "disclose his/her serostatus to a state public
health official or local review committee.... This review committee may recommend to the appro-
priate authority restrictions upon the physician's practice, if they believe there is a significant risk
to patients' welfare." Id. Therefore, the AMA apparently does not require HIV-infected physicians
to disclose this information to the patient. This position presumably is due in part to the AMA's
position that the risk of transmission from an infected HCP "remains immeasurably small":
"[T]he AMA reaffirm[s] its previous policy and continues to enhance its campaign to educate pa-
tients on the extremely small risks of iatrogenic (physician-induced) HIV infection." Id. at 98.
216. See note 11. The use of criminal sanctions for failure to inform has been proposed; the
Helms Amendment provides one example of such a proposal. See note 9. A Delaware bill, intro-
duced in 1991, would make it a misdemeanor for either HCPs or patients to fail to inform the
other of their HIV-positive status. See Donald H. J. Hermann, State Legislatures Consider Bills
Dealing with HIV-Infected Health Care Providers in Face of CDC Inaction, 24 J. Health & Hosp.
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equipped the judicial system may be to resolve such problems, it must
do so. This dilemma is complicated by the realization that the civil lia-
bility system often has difficulty in fulfilling the policy goals attributed
to it, let alone solving broader public policy issues. The policy goals
generally attributed to the tort system are to provide compensation for
those injured by tortious conduct and to deter tortious conduct.217 The
question considered in this Part is whether these policy goals can be
achieved by imposing liability on patients who fail to inform HCPs of
their infected status if their HCPs consequently suffer compensable in-
juries. The Article again undertakes this analysis in a comparative man-
ner in order to evaluate the relative efficacy of tort law in achieving its
goals of compensation and deterrence by imposing liability on
noninforming patients as compared to noninforming HCPs.
A. Compensation
With respect to the goal of compensation, assuming that liability
will be imposed on HCPs who fail to inform patients of their infected
status, what is the likelihood that injured patients would be able to sat-
isfy any judgment imposed upon the HCP? If the HCP is covered by
appropriate malpractice insurance, which will be the case in most in-
stances because such policies generally cover causes of action based
upon informed consent, then the likelihood of compensation should be
L. 215, 215-16 (1991) (discussing this bill and other state proposals). Whether the threat of crimi-
nal sanctions will provide a sufficient incentive for infected persons to disclose poses the same
problems as does the threat of civil liability. See also S.B. 1519, 40th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1992 Ariz.
Laws (declaring an HIV-infected physician's failure to inform patients before performing surgery
unprofessional conduct); H.B. 191, 136th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 1991-92 Del. Laws (requiring
testing of HCPs every six months and requiring disclosure of positive results to patients); S.B. 20,
13th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993 Fla. Laws (providing for mandatory HIV-testing of patients prior to
entering a hospital without requiring informed consent); S.B. 54, 17th Leg. Sess., 1st Reg. Sess.,
1993 Haw. Laws (requiring HIV-infected physicians and dentists to inform prospective patients);
H.B. 3048, 87th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 1991-92 Ill. Laws (requiring HIV-positive HCPs to inform
patients before conducting invasive procedures); S.B. 116, 88th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 1993-94
Ill. Laws (deleting a provision authorizing physicians to perform HIV tests after obtaining general
consent to treatment); H.B. 4519, 87th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1993 Mich. Laws (requiring periodic test-
ing for certain HCPs and patients); S.B. 88, 215th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1993 N.Y. Laws
(creating a duty on the part of physicians, dentists, and patients to disclose their HIV-status).
217. The major purposes of tort law have been stated as follows:
(1) to provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who might otherwise "take
the law into their own hands"; (2) to deter wrongful conduct; (3) to encourage socially respon-
sible behavior; and, (4) to restore injured parties to their original condition, insofar as the law
can do this, by compensating them for their injury.
William L. Prosser, et al., Cases and Materials on Torts 1 (Foundation, 8th ed. 1988). The first
three purposes may be generally described as aspects of deterrence; the three purposes also serve
the same social goals as criminal law. See George C. Christie and James E. Meeks, Cases and
Materials on the Law of Torts 5-6 (West, 2d ed. 1990).
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quite high, at least within the limits of the policy.218 Even if the dam-
ages exceed the policy's limits, the patient may be able to obtain satis-
faction out of the HCP's personal resources.2 19
In contrast, patients generally do not carry liability insurance that
would cover HCPs infected by noninforming patients. Thus, any com-
pensation that an HCP may recover would, in most instances, come out
of the personal assets of patients. Nonetheless, some patients may carry
some form of liability insurance (such as homeowners or rental liability
insurance) that provides coverage for "bodily injury" caused by an "oc-
currence." The HCP may recover provided that infection of an HCP by
a noninforming patient falls within the definitions of these terms.220
Case law seems to support the applicability of the standard form of
218. See, for example, South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liab. Ins. v. Ferry, 291 S.C. 459,
354 S.E.2d 378 (1987), which held that an insurer's liability under a standard medical malpractice
insurance policy is limited to the "performing or rendering of 'professional' acts or services .... A
'professional' act or service is one arising out of a vocation, calling, occupation, or employment
involving specialized knowledge, labor, or skill, and the labor or skill involved is predominantly
mental or intellectual, rather than physical or manual." Id. at 380 (quoting Marx v. Hartford Acci-
dent and Indem. Co., 183 Neb. 12, 157 N.W.2d 870, 871-72 (1968)). The Ferry court held that
allegations against the insured dentist, including "fail[ure] to obtain a proper informed consent,"
were covered by the policy. Ferry, 354 S.E.2d at 380-81.
219. See note 163 (discussing median salaries of HCPs).
220. The standard homeowner's insurance policy provides coverage with respect to personal
liability as follows:
If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily
injury or property damage caused by an occurrence to which this coverage applies, we will:
1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable.
Damages include prejudgment interest awarded against the insured.
2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice, even if the suit is groundless,
false or fraudulent. We may investigate and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appro-
priate. Our duty to settle or defend ends when the amount we pay for damages resulting from
the occurrence equals our limit of liability.
American Bar Association, Annotations to the Homeowners Policy 17-18 (ABA, 2d ed. 1990) (em-
phasis in original) ("ABA, Homeowners Policy"). The ABA defines "bodily injury" as "bodily
harm, sickness or disease, including required care, loss of services and death that results." Id. at 1.
The annotation defines "occurrence" as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to
substantially the same general harmful conditions, which results during the policy period, in...
bodily injury . . ." Id. at 2 (emphasis omitted).
According to these general definitions, the transmission of HIV (at least when the insured
does not know of his or her condition) appears to be an "occurrence" and the resulting transmis-
sion constitutes "bodily injury," HIV being a "sickness or disease." A more difficult question asks
whether the mere fear of contracting AIDS would constitute a "bodily injury." In Holcomb v.
Kincaid, 406 S.2d 646 (La. Ct. App. 1981), the court held that a complaint alleging humiliation,
embarrassment, and mental anguish stated a claim for "bodily injuries" for which the insurer was
obligated to defend:
We attach significance to the fact that the policy defines bodily injury to mean "sickness or
disease" in the instant case. These broad terms must include mental distress which persists
over a period of time and necessitates the taking of some medication and interferes with one's
performance at work.... We are unable to separate a person's nerves and tensions from his
body. It is common knowledge that worry and anxiety can and often do have a direct effect on
other bodily functions.
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homeowner insurance in the context of reversed informed consent.1
21
For example, in Loveridge v. Chartier,222 the Wisconsin Supreme Court
held that a homeowner's policy covered damages arising from the in-
sured's sexual intercourse with an underage girl who contracted herpes
from him. Although the insured's action constituted a misdemeanor,
the court reasoned that the sexual contact was not per se intentional, as
is rape or molestation; hence, the transmission of herpes could not be
termed intentional.223 According to this line of reasoning, even a pa-
tient's intentional withholding of information about the patient's in-
fected status from an HCP would not fall within the "intentional"
exclusion of a standard homoeowners policy.2 24
Id. at 649 (citations omitted). See also McGuire v. Am. States Ins. Co., 491 S.2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1986), af'd, 510 S.2d 1227 (1987) (holding that a material issue of disputed fact existed
regarding whether the plaintiff's complaints based on malicious prosecution and false imprison-
ment, which the plaintiff claimed had caused mental distress, headaches, and muscle spasms, con-
stituted "bodily injury" involving sickness or disease sufficient to invoke the provisions of a
standard policy). But see Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Doe, 173 Ariz. 112, 840 P.2d 288, 291 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992) (holding that the insureds did not have a claim for "bodily injury" under an auto
insurance policy based upon exposure to the blood of an automobile accident victim with AIDS;
the court did not consider the need for testing and fear of contracting AIDS to be bodily injuries).
For a discussion of whether fear of contracting AIDS while still testing negative should be suffi-
cient to sustain a cause of action in the context of negligent infliction of emotional distress, see
notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
221. See North Star Mutual Ins. Co. v. R.W., 431 N.W.2d 138 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). In
North Star, T.F. was insured under a standard homeowner's policy and engaged in voluntary sex-
ual intercourse with R.W. at T.F.'s home. R.W. alleged that T.F. negligently transmitted herpes to
her through the intercourse. T.F. alleged that he did not know he had herpes until a subsequent
medical exam. Id. at 139. The appellate court held that herpes was a "disease" and constituted a
bodily injury. Id. at 140. In finding that T.F.'s actions were an "accident" under the definition of
"occurrence" in the policy, the court stated: "The claim is based on negligence principles. Accord-
ingly, we hold that this is a material issue of fact for a jury to decide." Id. at 141. See also State
Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Irene S., 526 N.Y.S.2d 171 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (holding that
although injuries from the defendant's intentional acts of rape would not be covered by a standard
policy, unintended injuries such as the transmission of herpes would be covered); State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. v. Eddy, 267 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1990) (holding that an insurer had a duty to defend
the insured in an action based upon transmission of genital herpes by way of voluntary sexual
intercourse).
222. 161 Wis.2d 150, 468 N.W.2d 146 (1991).
223. Id. at 151. If intent to injure were inferred from the defendant's criminal acts, insurance
coverage would not apply because of the liability exclusion for intentional acts. See note 224 and
accompanying text. In Loveridge, the court refused to infer an intent to injure: "In Wisconsin, the
fact that a law is intended to prevent harm is insufficient to support an inference that as a matter
of law an insured intended to harm someone when the insured violated the law .... [C]onsensual
sexual intercourse between an adult and a 16- or 17-year-old does not create a 'substantial risk of
injury or death.'" Id. at 152-53 (quoting Raby v. Moe, 153 Wis.2d 101, 450 N.W.2d 452, 457
(1990)).
224. The standard homeowner's insurance policy excludes personal liability coverage for bod-
ily injury "which is expected or intended by the insured." ABA, Homeowners Policy at 18 (cited in
note 220). Thus, even if a patient knew that he or she had AIDS, one could argue that coverage
should still apply because, given the small chance of transmission, a patient could hardly "intend"
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In any event, the tort goal of providing compensation appears to be
more readily achievable by patients seeking recovery from HCPs than
the converse, but the possibility of HCPs recovering from patients is
not entirely foreclosed.
B. Deterrence
The goal of deterrence is less well served with respect to both
HCPs and patients. As is the general case with respect to insurance
coverage, the deterrence goal may be undermined by failing to impose
any direct liability upon HCPs, because the policy carrier pays any
judgments within the policy limits. 22 5 The potential for increased pre-
miums or the potential for cancellation of the policy may, however, pro-
vide a deterrent effect.226 In the case of infected HCPs with limited
career and life expectancy, however, such a deterrent hardly provides
an effective incentive to disclose. Moreover, HCPs face a great disincen-
tive to inform patients of their infected status, because such disclosure
is likely to result in the loss of professional livelihood or, at minimum, a
severe restriction in the individual HCP's scope of practice. Thus, the
deterrent effect arising from the fear of liability based upon failure to
secure informed consent from patients would likely have minimum im-
transmission through a surgical or other medical procedure, even if the patient's failure to inform
the physician was considered either a crime or a tort.
See Alber v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 187 Mich. App. 557, 468 N.W.2d 282 (1991). In
Alber, the insured engaged in sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, who, although 27 years old, was
mildly retarded. Id. at 283. As a result, the insured was charged with third-degree criminal con-
duct. Id. at 284. The court held that the intentional act exclusionary clause in the homeowner's
policy did not relieve the defendant of the duty to defend: "[T]he exclusionary clause is applicable
only if the insured subjectively intended both his act and the resulting injury .... While Smith
readily admits that he intended to have sexual intercourse with [plaintiff], he has consistently
denied any intent to injure [plaintiff], as well as any awareness that she was incapable of giving
consent." Id. (citations omited). See also North Star, 431 N.W.2d at 143 (considering it a material
issue of fact whether the insured's sexual intercourse resulting in transmission of herpes was "in-
tentional" conduct); Eddy, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 382-84 (prohibiting indemnification of the insured for
conduct the insured knew to be unlawful if the insured knew at the time he had intercourse that
he was acting unlawfully by potentially transmitting genital herpes).
225. See Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 9-10 (cited in note
174). The authors question the deterrent effect of tort law by noting that people are "dominated
by a concern for personal safety rather than the legal and hence financial consequences of behav-
ior-especially on the part of those who carry liability insurance"; nonetheless, Landes and Posner
maintain that the available empirical evidence indicates a deterrent effect, even in the area of
automobile accidents in which liability insurance is widespread. See also Pegalis and Wachsman,
American Law of Medical Malpractice at 2-9 (cited in note 3); Harvard Study at 2-3, 2-8 (cited in
note 75) (claiming that "to suggest that liability insurance fully insulates doctors from the impact
of the tort system is somewhat unrealistic"); Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Com-
mon Law of Medical Malpractice: Thoughts About the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 Syr-
acuse L. Rev. 939, 990 (1984) (concluding that malpractice liability has a deterrent effect).
226. See Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law at 10-11 (cited in note
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pact on HCPs. Nonetheless, malpractice insurance carriers have an eco-
nomic incentive to cancel policies of infectious HCPs.25 7 Further, health
care institutions employing or granting staff privileges to infected HCPs
would be likely to restrict the practice of those HCPs.228
Patients, who are less likely to have insurance coverage, are de-
terred by the fear of having their personal assets attached to satisfy
judgments against them. In many instances, infected patients are likely
to be judgment-proof; in such cases, little effective economic incentive
to disclose exists. Moreover, patients, like HCPs, have strong disincen-
tives to disclose their infected status, for fear of not receiving health
care treatment and of losing health insurance coverage and employ-
ment. Indeed, patients may be induced to misrepresent their infected
status if they fear HCPs will not accept them as patients or continue to
treat them.5 9 Some deterrent effect may exist, however, because pa-
tients often will not have sufficient personal assets to pay for health
care and other needs if they face liability for failure to disclose.
Although neither compensation nor deterrence appears to be effec-
tively served with respect to HCPs seeking redress in tort against
noninforming patients, this fact does not undermine the validity of the
proposed cause of action based upon reverse informed consent. Individ-
ual plaintiffs (including HCPs), of course, would be primarily concerned
with compensation rather than deterrence. If any possibility of compen-
227. See generally Mark S. Rhodes, Health Insurance, in AIDS and the Law at 287 (cited in
note 188) (discussing exclusions, testing, and statutory limitations); Mark H. Jackson, Health In-
surance: The Battle over Limits on Coverage, in AIDS Agenda at 146 (cited in note 18) (discuss-
ing discriminatory exclusions and caps on benefits). See also McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946
F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that an employer did not violate ERISA when it reduced the
maximum benefits available to persons with HIV under a group medical plan from $1 million to
$5000).
228. See, for example, Estate of Behringer v. Med. Ctr. at Princeton, 249 N.J. Super. 597,
592 A.2d 1251 (1991) (discussing a hospital that required informed consent and barred an HIV-
positive surgeon from performing invasive procedures). See generally Carol J. Gerner, AIDS in the
Healthcare Workplace: Rights and Responsibilities, 1 Annals Health L. 119 (1992) (reviewing
cases). Under the ADA, employees with AIDS qualify as disabled; therefore, employers may be
restricted from firing or reassigning a "qualified individual with a disability" who, "with or without
reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (West, 1992). See Feldblum, Workplace
Issues: HIV and Discrimination, in AIDS Agenda at 270, 279-84 (cited in note 18) (discussing the
ADA in the context of employment relations). Infected HCPs, however, are fighting back; for ex-
ample, an HIV-positive surgeon has filed complaints in federal district court and with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission after a hospital suspended his clinical privileges. See 1
Health L. Rep. (BNA) 381 (1992). In response to a letter from the U.S. Dep't of Health and
Human Services, a hospital reinstated an HIV-infected nurse, who had been reassigned to a secre-
tarial position, to her critical care position. Id. at 411.
229. The ADA and other nondiscrimination statutes theoretically may bar HCPs from refus-
ing to provide treatment based on a patient's infectious status. Infectious patients may find it
more realistic, however, to rely on nondisclosure to obtain treatment rather than to rely on the
vagaries of the law.
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sation exists based upon the particular financial condition or insurance
coverage of a patient, undoubtedly the HCP, or someone acting on her
behalf, will take civil action.
C. The Effectiveness of Other Measures of Protection
Alternative public and private measures may protect HCPs against
nondisclosing patients if the tort system effectively cannot. There are
significant public policy interests in protecting HCPs. HCPs are highly
valuable members of society who provide necessary health care services
to the general public as well as to infected individuals. Exposing HCPs
to unreasonable risks created by nondisclosing patients if those risks
could be made reasonable by disclosure would offend public policy.23 0 In
addition, requiring disclosure by patients to HCPs furthers the public
policy goal of reducing the spread of infectious disease, not only to
HCPs but also to others who may be at risk.2 3' Also, imposing a duty on
patients to disclose their infectious status would serve the goal of pro-
viding wide access to health care to infectious patients. Such disclosure
should minimize the fear of HCPs, and may encourage them to con-
tinue practicing in high-risk fields. Finally, patients themselves may be
protected by disclosing their infectious status to their HCPs, because
disclosure enables their HCPs to diagnose and treat them according to
the most appropriate professional standards.
As previously mentioned, a number of states have enacted statutes
authorizing physicians to order HIV testing of patients without pa-
tients' informed consent, provided that testing is medically indicated. 32
The constitutionality of such legislation will likely be tested. In any
event, it is unlikely that such legislation will be uniformly adopted, and
it is unclear whether physicians would rely widely upon such statutes,
although physicians are the only HCPs authorized by state statutes to
act without patient consent. Moreover, patients who are aware of the
statutes may be even more disinclined to reveal personal characteristics
and symptoms to their physician for fear of being tested.2 3
230. This paradox is recognized (but not resolved) in Ordway (discussed in text accompany-
ing notes 124-40).
231. See Larry Gostin and William J. Curran, AIDS Screening, Confidentiality, and the
Duty to Warn, 77 Am. J. Pub. Health 361, 364 (1987) (discussing the duty of physicians to screen
patients for AIDS and to warn third parties). Disclosure to third parties may be regulated by
statute. For example, under the Illinois AIDS Confidentiality Act, 410 ILCS 305/9(a) (Smith-Hurd,
1993), a physician may notify the spouse of a patient who tests positive for HIV if the patient
refuses to do so or a reasonable period of time has elapsed without notification. The statute immu-
nizes the physician from criminal and civil liability for good faith disclosure or nondisclosure.
232. See note 203.
233. Indeed, patients may forego health care because of the fear of being tested in jurisdic-
tions that have statutes permitting testing without the patient's consent.
1478 [Vol. 46:1417
REVERSE INFORMED CONSENT
In the absence of any significant deterrent effect on patients im-
posed by the tort system, and the unlikelihood of any effective public
deterrent being provided, concerned HCPs may adopt certain private
measures for their own protection. Many of these measures are obvious
and presumably HCPs already take many of these precautions. These
steps include the careful taking of patient histories, asking patients di-
rectly whether they are infected or have been tested, and requesting
test results. If a patient has not been tested, an HCP should question
the patient carefully about common symptoms of infectious diseases.
Although the professional standard of care now requires the use of uni-
versal precautions with respect to all patients, more rigorous usage may
be indicated, particularly with respect to patients who are less than
forthright in their disclosures. In high risk situations in which universal
precautions are not fully effective, HCPs could condition their willing-
ness to treat on patients' agreement to be tested. Indeed, in any situa-
tion in which testing is medically (that is, professionally) indicated,
conditioning treatment on testing appears justifiable.3 4
Those HCPs who have the professional autonomy to do so may re-
strict their practices to those patients found acceptable to them, pro-
vided refusal to accept a patient is not based on impermissible grounds
(such as race, creed, color, national origin, or disability). s5 Thus, HCPs
would be justified in refusing to accept or to treat patients who refuse
to comply with a request to be tested, provided the request is reasona-
ble and based on professional standards. If an HCP-patient relationship
exists, termination of that relationship also would be justifiable after
the patient has been afforded a reasonable period of time in which to
retain other health care services. 36
234. If the professional standard of care indicates testing, informed consent imposes a duty
on the HCP to inform the patient of material risks associated with the test. Courts have also held
that HCPs have a duty to inform the patient of the material risks of not undergoing-the test. See
Truman v. Thomas, 165 Cal. Rptr. 308, 611 P.2d 902 (1980) (recognizing a duty to inform a patient
of the "potentially fatal consequences of allowing cervical cancer to develop undetected by a pap
smear"). After so informing patients or potential patients, HCPs should have the option of refus-
ing to enter or continue a patient-HCP relationship with those patients who refuse professionally
indicated testing. In fact, the CDC once took the position that all patients should be routinely
encouraged to undergo testing. See CDC Proposes Routine Patient Tests for AIDS, Mod. Health-
care 3 (Sept. 23, 1991). The CDC based this proposal on the notion that many HCPs "prefer to
know whether a patient is infected so they can adhere more closely to universal precautions." Id.
235. See Michael C. Macdonald, et al., Health Care Law § 20.01[4] (Matthew Bender, 1992)
(summarizing antidiscrimination statutes). Many HCPs (in particular, employees), of course, do
not have full professional autonomy, a fact which raises serious questions about their practical
ability to refuse to treat patients who refuse to disclose their infected status.
236. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Code of
Medical Ethics Current Opinions § 8.11 at 39 (AMA, 1992):
Neglect of Patient: Physicians are free to choose whom they will serve. The physician should,
however, respond to the best of his or her ability in cases of emergency where first aid treat-
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A more formalized approach to the HCP-patient relationship may
provide advantages to both parties by specifying the requirement that
both parties disclose infected status and the consequences of nondisclo-
sure. The contractual relationship between HCPs and patients gener-
ally arises by implication, although HCPs commonly employ written
informed consent forms.23 7 HCPs could require an express contract
under which persons are accepted as patients on the condition that they
disclose their infectious status, if known (including test results), or sub-
mit to an appropriate test. The contract should specify that the HCP is
obligated to accept the person as a patient if infectious and that the
HCP is obligated to maintain all patient information in confidence.3 8
The contract might further require that if, during the course of the re-
lationship, the patient becomes infectious, or if the HCP within his or
her medical judgment believes the patient requires testing, the patient
will disclose or comply; failure to do so may result in termination of the
relationship upon reasonable notice sufficient for the patient to obtain
other health care.239
The imposition on patients of such contractual obligations to dis-
close need not raise the specter of adhesion contracts and exculpatory
clauses. A contract that imposes a positive duty on patients to disclose
their infectious status is not a contract of adhesion in the sense in
which that term is commonly used. Conditioning the HCP-patient rela-
tionship on patient disclosure should be sharply contrasted with condi-
ment is essential. Once having undertaken a case, the physician should not neglect the pa-
tient, nor withdraw from the case without giving notice to the patient, the relatives, or
responsible friends sufficiently long in advance of withdrawal to permit another medical at-
tendant to be secured.
237. See text accompanying note 27.
238. One could argue that the HCP offers little, if any, consideration for the promise of dis-
closure by patients, because HCPs have a legal and ethical duty to accept infectious patients for
treatment and to maintain their confidentiality. HCPs have no duty, however, to accept nondis-
closing patients, at least when nondisclosure occurs in non-emergency circumstances. Moreover, a
cause of action based on breach of contract may provide a more effective remedy for patients than
reliance on statutory or common-law theories.
239. A practical means by'which HCPs can impose disclosure requirements may be through
"patient history forms," which individuals commonly fill out prior to their first visit with an HCP.
The form could include questions designed to elicit information regarding whether the individual
has an infectious disease or symptoms indicative of such a disease. The form should close with a
statement to the effect that failure to answer questions or misrepresentations could result in the
HCP's refusal to accept that individual as a patient or to continue the relationship; the form
should state further that any injuries sustained as a consequence of misrepresentation by the pa-
tient could result in civil liability. Individuals should be asked to sign an insurance form-like aver-
ment that the answers given are accurate to the best of their knowledge. This approach may sound
draconian, but it would lay the groundwork for a fraudulent misrepresentation action, such as the
action used to advantage in Boulais v. Lustig. See notes 15, 117-23 and accompanying text. Hope-




tioning treatment on the patient's agreement to waive any claim for
recovery against the HCP for negligent treatment. For example, in
Tunkl v. Regents of University of California,'2 0 the California Supreme
Court held unenforceable a contract provision in which, as a condition
of treatment in the hospital, charity patients were required to release
the hospital from liability for negligent conduct of its employees occur-
ring during the course of treatment.2 41 The court noted that, as a gen-
eral rule, exculpatory provisions in contracts that affect "the public
interest" are invalid and delineated a number of characteristics such
contracts would possess. These characteristics center around whether
the party seeking exculpation is engaged in an activity subject to public
regulation and which is of great public importance, makes its services
available to the public, has decisive bargaining strength, offers only a
"standardized adhesion contract of exculpation," and requires the other
party to bear the risk of its carelessness. 4"
While any contract between an HCP and a patient may be catego-
rized as involving "the public interest," Tunkl focused on the exculpa-
tory nature of the contract. In contrast, the present proposal does not
intend to exculpate or release HCPs from liability or to encourage all
HCPs to employ a standardized contract.243 Under the proposed con-
tract, acceptance or continuation as a patient is made contingent only
upon the disclosure of the patient's infectious status; HCPs remain ob-
ligated to accept and treat disclosing patients and to maintain the pa-
tient's confidentiality within the professional standard of care. HCPs
would, of course, retain the option of accepting patients without testing
or disclosure, but this should be done at the discretion of the HCP.
In sum, the safest course of conduct for concerned HCPs may be to
resort to self-help in the form of careful evaluation of persons prior to
240. 32 Cal. Rptr. 33, 383 P.2d 441 (1963).
241. In Tunkl, the document the plaintiff signed was entitled "Conditions of Admission" and
provided:
RELEASE: The hospital is a nonprofit, charitable institution. In consideration of the hospital
and allied services to be rendered and the rates charged therefor, the patient or his legal
representative agrees to and hereby releases The Regents of the University of California, and
the hospital from any and all liability for the negligent or the wrongful acts or omissions of its
employees, if the hospital has used due care in selecting its employees.
Id. at 442.
242. Id. at 444-46.
243. Other commentators have gone so far as to argu6 that HCPs should be permitted to
shift the risk of substandard treatment to patients by contract. See generally Richard A. Epstein,
Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 87; Clark C. Havighurst,
Decentralizing Decision Making: Private Contract Versus Professional Norms, in Jack A. Meyer,
ed., Market Reforms in Health Care 22 (Am. Enterprise Inst., 1983); Glen 0. Robinson, Rethink-
ing the Allocation of Medical Risks Between Patients and Providers, 49 L. & Contemp. Probs. 173
(1986) (critiquing the Tunkl factors in the malpractice context).
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accepting them as patients, and the utilization of an express contractual
provision conditioning acceptance or continuance as a patient on the
patient's agreement to disclose infected status or to undergo testing.
V. CONCLUSION
The primary goal of this Article has been to establish the viability
of a cause of action based upon "reverse informed consent," according
to which a duty is imposed on patients to inform their HCPs of mate-
rial risks-in particular HIV-infected status-associated with the pa-
tients' care. The Article's thesis has been advanced by a two-step
comparative analysis. First, the doctrine of informed consent was shown
to impose a duty on HCPs to disclose their infectious status to patients
prior to treatment. Second, the Article compared this proposition with
its converse: the imposition of a duty on patients to inform their HCPs
of the patients' infectious status. On the basis of analogy, risk-utility,
and economic analyses, the Article concludes that placing a duty upon
patients to disclose is clearly justified when a comparable duty is im-
posed upon HCPs to secure informed consent by disclosing their infec-
tious status to their patients. The standard proposed for determining
whether a patient has breached the duty to disclose asks whether a rea-
sonable person would or should have known that nondisclosure
presented a material risk to an HCP undertaking a particular
treatment.
Causation presents a more difficult problem with respect to pa-
tients' failure to disclose than with respect to HCPs' failure to disclose
in an informed consent context. This Article maintains that causation
can be satisfied by demonstrating that a patient's failure to disclose de-
prived an HCP of the opportunity to consider less risky alternatives to
the proposed treatment, to refer the patient to other HCPs if profes-
sionally indicated, or to employ a higher degree of care as warranted by
the patient's infected status. Damages present substantially the same
problems in both traditional and reverse informed consent cases.
While the Article asserts that tort theory clearly supports the
adoption of a doctrine such as reverse informed consent, the policy
goals of tort law-compensation and deterrence-cannot be fully imple-
mented for two reasons: because patients are not deep-pocket defend-
ants as a rule and because patients are unlikely to be deterred from
nondisclosure in view of their fears of being refused treatment and of
loss of confidentiality. In view of the unlikely possibility that public
measures will be imposed to induce disclosure by patients to their
HCPs, the Article proposes that concerned HCPs take private measures
to protect themselves. These measures may take the form of careful
evaluation prior to accepting or treating patients, or the utilization by
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HCPs of an express contract conditioning acceptance and continuation
as a patient upon the patients' agreement to disclose and obligating
HCPs to accept and continue the HCP-patient relationship upon that
disclosure.

